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ABSTRACT
In this thesis I propose an alternative process for resolving
zoning disputes - mediated negotiation - to be used within the
framework of the current zoning administrative process.
In the first part of the paper I examine the nature of the
current zoning administrative process. A case study of a
zoning dispute in Arlington, Massachusetts demonstrates
problems of the traditional zoning process. Specific
characteristics of the process that may create controversies
include; 1) the lack of direct communication between all
parties, 2) the adversary nature of interactions, 3) the lack
of representation of all interested parties, 4) the inability
of parties to search for mutually satisfactory solutions, and
5) the difficulties of addressing the full range of issues of
concern.
In the second part of the paper I propose a process called
mediated negotiation to address the deficiencies of the
traditional zoning administrative process identified in the
first part. A neutral third party assists parties with an
interest in the zoning dispute to meet together to search for
a mutually satisfactory resolution. I develop a model for
mediation which address the problems in the traditional zoning
process. This model includes; 1) inclusion of all parties, 2)
information sharing, 3) improving relationships, and 4)
managing of the discussions by an outsider. A case study of a
mediated zoning dispute in Blacksburg, Virginia demonstrates
the value of this model.
There are several legal and political constraints on the use
of mediation in the zoning process. Legal constraints may
influence the style and scope of the mediation sessions, the
mechanisms for enforcing agreements, and the nature of the
participants.
The institutionalization of the model may be impeded by
existing power imbalances in the administrative process, the
conceptualization of mediation in partisan terms, and a
hesitation of potential participants to engage in an
unfamiliar process.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael Wheeler
Title: Visiting Professor, Department of Urban Studies
and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
This paper raises the question of whether the use of
mediated negotiation could improve the current administrative
process for small parcel zoning changes, ensuring fairness and
efficiency in the decision making process. To answer this
question I first review the current system to discover where
there are deficiencies in the process. Then I propose
mediated negotiation for addressing these deficiencies. This
paper offers one particular perspective on potential changes
in certain aspects of the zoning administrative process; I do
not suggest other possible revisions in the zoning process,
which in many cases functions relatively well. I suggest
mediated negotiation as a voluntary option that works within
the existing s-tatutory structure of the traditional zoning
process.
In her recent article "Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal
Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy", Carol Rose
describes the nature of small parcel land use decisions as a
matter of "deal making" between local government officials,
citizens and developers.(1) She describes local land use
regulations as a series of piecemeal efforts on the part of
local governments to. regulate land uses for small parcels of
land. Such decisions, in contrast to the wide ranging policy
decisions of master plans and major rezoning, affect only a
few individuals with specific interests in the regulations.
Assigned to the task of determining these changes, locally
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appointed or elected bodies serve as a "mediator" between
developers and irrate citizens.(2) The Rose article concludes
that if, in fact, these decisions are made on an ad hoc,
piecemeal basis, then the process should be designed to ensure
fairness.
Rose recognizes that land use decisions are very local in
their nature, requiring a high degree of interaction between
local citizens and the decision-making body.(2) But because a
local government official may feel concerned about issues of
"separation-of-powers," a process overtly encouraging greater
participation and interaction between local government and
citizens could run counter to these notions. Meanwhile, the
current quasi-judicial proceedings, though intended to provide
due process, are limited as a forum in which parties may
exchange information and ideas.(4) Rose proposes a mediation
model'as.a way to resolve conflicts over local land use
disputes.(5) A mediation model "attempts to assure due
consideration...through hearing from interested parties and
attempting to arrive at an accommodation acceptable to them
within the framework of larger community norms."(6) Rose
suggests mediation is a better means for achieving fairness
and efficiency in land use decision-making.
Where Carol Rose ends her discussion, this paper
begins.(7) What are the possibilities for using mediated
negotiation to resolve zoning disputes? What problems will be
solved? What are the shortcomings of the process? Chapter
One analyzes current practices. This chapter presents an
overview of the Massachusetts Zoning Enabling Act prescribing
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the process of rezoning, and the granting of variances and
special use permits (conditional uses). The high degree of
interactions between developers, public officials and
community members becomes evident through the administrative
steps of filing an application for zoning relief, review of
the application by public officials, public hearings, and
making the final decision.
In Chapter Two, to demonstrate the nature of ad hoc
discussions in the administrative process, I will present a
case study of a rezone request in Arlington, Massachusetts.
This case will explore the nature of conflicts arising
throughout the administrative process and describe how
different actors respond within the statutorily prescribed
steps mentioned above. The analysis suggest how problems
develop because of the nature of the interactions among
parties.
The next part of the paper will focus on the potential
for applying mediated negotiation in the zoning administrative
process. Chapter Three contains a discussion of the theories
and "nuts and bolts" of mediation as an alternative dispute
resolution technique. This discussion establishes generic
steps to apply in order to mediate a zoning dispute. It will
demonstrate how this technique brings together important
parties in a dispute to share information, explore a wide
variety of alternative solutions, create a durable agreement,
improve the efficiency of the process and improve
relationships between the parties.
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Chapter Four analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of
mediation as a way to improve the administrative process
described in the first part of the paper. A case study
involving a request for special permits at a shopping center
in Blacksburg, Virginia is the basis of the discussion. Early
in the administrative process government officials proposed
mediation as a way to resolve a conflict which could have
become a major community conflict and a long legal battle. A
critique of the mediation effort points out important factors
of the technique which overcome many of the limitations of the
traditional process.
The fifth chapter explores some legal implications of
mediated negotiation of small parcel zoning decisions. The
two major issues discussed are 1) what legally sanctioned
mechanisms exist to place restrictions on rezones, special
permits and variances, and 2) what are the legal implications
of government officials participation in the negotiation
process.
Finally, Chapter Six examines political considerations
that could arise from efforts to institutionalize this
technique. One method for institutionalization described in
this paper is the enactment of a state enabling legislation.
Efforts to enact legislation in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island
illustrate some of the barriers that might be encountered.
In conclusion, I propose a model of the zoning
administrative process that would involve the use of
mediation. Although not always appropriate, I suggest this
model could be useful to overcome some process deficiencies of
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the traditional zoning process demonstrated by the Arlington
case in Chapter Two. Given certain political and legal
constraints, this model could provide an important tool in the
zoning process to address issues of fairness and efficiency.
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CHAPTER ONE
ZONING PROCEDURES: AN OVERVIEW
Efforts to rezone small parcels of city land often cause
community-wide conflicts. A developer wishing to rezone a
parcel of land where there is no as-of-right to build, must
apply for permission with the local government and follow
through a statutorily defined process. Throughout this
process the developer interacts with the local government and
parties with an interest in the zoning decision. This section
describes four major steps in this process; 1) filing of the
application, 2) review of the application, 3) public hearings
and 4) making a decision. While opportunities exist within
the structure of these different stages for discussions among
parties, these required interactions tend to widen the gap of
misunderstanding and force the participants to adopt adversary
positions. In this section I will highlight some of the major
problems that arise in each of these stages and have the
potential for creating controversies. I examine the four
steps described above for rezones, special permits and
variances.
A. FILING AN APPLICATION
The first administrative step is the filing of an
application. The process for rezones is slightly different
than for special permits or variances. These differences will-
be described below.
Rezoning (or amendments to the local zoning code) is a
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"legislative matter." Technically, a developer seeking to
change the existing zoning on a parcel of land must submit a
proposal - in the form of an ordinance - to the city council.
Fashioning such an ordinance often requires a high degree of
interaction between the developer and local officials. When
community responses may be negative to the proposal, the
developer may choose to approach concerned citizens to ask
their opinions. The developer may also spend a great deal of
time meeting with council members to learn their reactions to
the proposal prior to a formal filing.
An application that has not been reviewed by local
officials before submission by local officials faces the
likelihood of rejection. In an article describing the process
of amending a zon.ing ordinance in Massachusetts, two land use
attorneys suggest that the formula is "one part procedure to
nine parts politics."(1) That is, procedural requirements
such as submitting proposals to the proper authorities for
review within the statutory time frame cannot be overlooked,
but the failure to meet with interested parties may lead to
denial of a request.
The procedure for variances and Special Use Permits (i.e.
conditional uses), unlike zoning amendments is administrative
(rather than legislative) in nature. These types of permits
are decided by approval officials, often a zoning board of
appeals, who sit as judges. Like rezones, political
considerations play an important role in these decisions as
well. Applicants often approach city planners, members of the
planning board, (each of whom may issue recommendations to the
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zoning board), and community groups in an effort to win their
support for proposed projects. The zoning board of appeals,
appointed by the mayor, may use this information while
applying standards of the local ordinance to the specific
property to determine whether to grant the request.(2) In
some communities, planning boards are authorized through the
local zoning ordinance to hold preliminary review sessions
with the developer prior to formal submission of an
application.(3)
B. REVIEW OF APPLICATIONS
The second stage in the zoning process is the review of
applications by government officials. Once the city receives
a formal rezoning application, the clock begins to wind down.
Within 14 days of filing, an ordinance must be submitted to
the planning board for review.(4) -Within 65 days, the council
must hold a public hearing on the application.(5) For
rezoning as well as for variances and special permits, the
decision-making body must take a final vote within 90 days
following the public hearing.(6) In all, city officials must
review, comment and vote on an application within six months.
A proposal may require additional public review by
numerous offices and boards.(7) Each may be required to hold
separate meetings and issue a separate report. In order to
meet the six months deadline for a highly complex proposal,
decisions may be made in haste, important parties may be
excluded from the process, or delays may be imposed by
government officials (at great cost to the applicant).
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Initial consideration of a proposed zoning amendment
begins with the Planning Board. This board, charged with
reviewing all local zoning decisions, reviews each application
to ensure adherance to the local master plan or city growth
policies.(8) Often times the Planning Department, acting as
staff to the Planning Board, provides an initial status report
on the proposal.(9) The Planning Board reviews such
recommendations at a public meeting. At the same time the
Board may also invite comments from the public and the
applicant.(10) Such meetings may be the first opportunity for
the community to respond to a proposal and raise objections.
This report from the Planning Board to the City Council
is merely advisory.(ll) The recommendations of the Board
often reflect the goals of the Mayor or the Planning
Department. The reactions of the Council may depend on the
relationships between individual council members and the
Mayor. Recommendations may be rejected or disputed. Council
members may also find the recommendations do not reflect
sufficient attention to the interests of their constituents.
By taking a stand, council members reinforce the adversary
nature of the rezoning process.
A local zoning ordinance may also require petitions for
special permits to be submitted to various municipal agencies
for review. These agencies' recommendations, including the
board of health, the planning board or department, the city
engineer, and the conservation commission, may help'the
decision-making body develop a more complete understanding of
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the impacts of a proposed plan.(12) In some jurisdictions,
final permit approval is contingent upon receipt of
recommendations from these other agencies. Reviews by these
agencies are typically in the form of hearings and often are
the first opportunity for a public airing of objections to a
proposed project. Developers present their proposals while
members of the public and various boards respond by voicing
their concerns.
Often, political infighting between boards will deepen
the conflict over a proposed project. While the planning
board may express concern over one aspect of a project, their
concern may be disregarded by the zoning board which may have
its own set of concerns. For example, while a planning board
may evaluate a development proposal from a long range planning
perspective, the zoning board may be concerned with immediate
development.
The permit review period provides a developer with a
chance to engage in ad hoc discussions with all concerned
parties. However, the typical administrative process may
provide a limited context for disputing parties to resolve
their differences. Public meetings may provide a forum for
airing of differences but often are an inappropriate forum for
seeking resolution of conflicts. The meetings, sponsored by
the reviewing body, allow the developer to clarify the
proposal and allow the officials to accept comments from the
community. At these meetings each party may merely state
concerns with the proposal. Thus, parties may be limited in
their ability to directly interact with one another to hear
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concerns and seek solutions. In some circumstances, rather
than address issues immediately, the Board may simply take
note of the issues raised, later discussion among themselves
the importance of each comment. -
C. PUBLIC HEARINGS
Following the review period, permitting bodies are
required to hold their own public hearings. These formal
meetings satisfy the constitutional requirements of due
process allowing affected parties an opportunity to comment on
proposed projects.(13) There are three purposes for public
hearings: 1) to inform decision makers of public opinion on
policy issues; 2) to acquaint decision-makers with specific
facts concerning affected property; and 3) to give property
owners an opportunity to comment on decisions concerning their
land. (14)
Theoretically, the hearing should be used to improve the
decision-maker's understanding of the problem. However, like
other public meetings, a hearing often becomes a political
"showdown." Council members have discussed the proposal with
the planning board, constituents and even the developer.
Neighbors, violently opposed to a project, may come to the
hearing and demand the permit be denied because it will
adversely affect their neighborhood. At the same time, other
community members may come (often at the request of the
developer) to speak in favor of the project, praising the
quality and sensitivity of the design. Thus, by the time a
hearing arrives, there is little new information yet to learn.
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Notice requirements determine, in part, the
characteristic of the audience attending a public hearing. In
theory, rezoning is a legislative matter for which due process
standards are not guaranteed to affected individuals.(15) By
law, notice of public hearings for rezoning are only required
in a local newspaper of general circulation and posting in
city hall. Consequently, the audience may represent a limited
spectrum of the community.
In contrast, public hearings for special permit and
variances require much more rigid notice standards to satisfy
due process requirements. Courts believe decisions affecting
the aggrieved parties should be made following strict
procedural due process requirements because granting a special
permit or variance affects specific individuals.(16) The
1930 case of Kane v. Board of Appeal of'Medford(17)
illustrates the importance of compliance with notice standards
in Massachusetts. The decision states that "Such full notice
[shall be provided] as shall enable all those interested to
know what is projected and to have opportunity to protest, and
as shall insure fair presentation and consideration of all
aspects of the proposed modification."(18)
In addition to postings and publications, notices for
public hearings for special permits and variances must be
mailed to "parties in interest" as defined by statute.(19)
Masssachusetts law designates six different parties: the
petitioner, abutters, owners of land directly opposite on a
public or private street, abutters within 300 feet of the
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project, the planning board of the city, and the planning
board of every abutting city or town. Parties in interest are
clearly defined as those individuals with a real property
interest or city planners.
As may be expected, neighbors are most likely to attend
variance and special permit hearings. On the other hand,
rezone hearings are often attended by organizations who
monitor local development issues. Neighbors may only learn of
a rezone through citizens groups, the developer, or by
watching notices in the local paper. While there are
individuals who religiously attend public hearings, those who
may also be affected by the decision, yet not considered a
"party in interest" (in a strict legal sense) may never know
about such hearings, thus losing their chance to comment.
In the case of special permits and variances, the hearing
may be the only opportunity for public comment. Where the
decision-making body adheres to strict procedural guidelines,
presentations may be structured to hear first from those in
favor, then from those opposed to the project. The developer
may only be allowed to respond to criticisms in a formal
rebuttal. This format allows very little interaction between
the parties and no opportunity to explore alternatives that
might resolve their differences.
The use of attorneys by either the developer or community
groups changes the nature of the communication among the
parties. Developers will often leave presentations to their
attorneys. As a result, information presented for the record
may be what lawyers consider important. The attorney may
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answer questions put to the developer to ensure no statements
are made that could later be used as damaging evidence should
the decision be appealed. The presence of the attorney may
enhance a communication gap among the parties - the developer,
decision-making body and community members - since the parties
do not address each other and major concerns for the
individuals may be submerged by "legally important" ones.
Citizens or community groups opposed to a proposal may
also have the resources to have a lawyer present their case.
Again, aware of the importance of creating a defensible
record, the -community attorney may enhance the adversary
nature of the proceedings by concentrating only on those
issues with significant legal ramifications. Meanwhile, real
concerns of the neighborhood may never be aired. For example,
rather than stressing community concerns about the impact a
project ~might have on property values, an attorney may focus
on the failure of the proposed zoning amendment to conform to
the jurisdictional comprehensive plan.
D. MAKING A DECISION
Following the public hearing, the board makes a final
decision. Rezones are decided upon by city councils or
elected officials. Variances and special permits, in
contrast, are granted by an appointed body, either the zoning
board of appeals or a designated public body such as a
specially appointed special permit board.
In accordance with due process requirements for
administrative decisions, permit granting authorities must
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accompany decisions for variances and special permits with
reasons. These findings of fact, based on evidence entered
onto the record at the public hearing, are intended to ensure
decisions are not made in an arbitrary fashion.(20)
By statute, the decision-making bodies are required to
issue a decision within a given time period; in Massachusetts
-it is three months after the hearing.(21) During this period
the Board may call back the applicant to discuss details of
the proposed project. Often the developer may be required to
submit additional information, including detailed site plans
or engineering studies. If in the course of these
discussions major alterations are made to the initial
proposal, a new hearing may be held affording the public an
opportunity to. comment on the changes.
For rezoning, a new hearing must be held if the decision-
making body fails to vote on the amendment in the required
time period.(22) Therefore, developers encourage timely
decisions in order to avoid further delays in their project.
In contrast, special permits or variances are deemed approved
if no final decision is made within the specified time.(23)
In these case the pressure is on the municipality to act.
E. ANALYSIS
The different parties in a zoning dispute interact from a
very early point in the administrative process. In fact,
discussions may begin long before the formal filing of an
application. Ad hoc, informal discussions may lead to
agreements between the developer, community groups and local
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governments. Other times these interactions may spur
controversies. Such controversies may lead to unstable
outcomes, major community disruptions, long litigation
battles, or growing distrust among the parties. Ad hoc
interactions may create controversies because 1) there is a
lack of direct communication among all the parties, 2) the
adversary nature of typical administrative procedures, 3) the
lack of representation of all interested parties, 4) the
inability of parties to search for mutually satisfactory
solutions and, 5) the difficulties of addressing the full
range of issues of concern.
Using a process in which some of these characteristics
could be overcome (or at least addressed) is one way of trying
to avoid what may become controversial outcomes of the zoning
process. In the current administrative process parties rarely
have any opportunities to meet in non-adversary settings to
discuss issues. The developer may meet separately with
numerous public agencies and community groups. However,
rarely do all interested parties meet together to discuss
solutions for conflicts. Citizens attend meetings hosted by
public boards or agencies. Yet the structure of these
meetings may limit the ability of the parties to discuss ways
of resolving conflicts.
The structure of interactions at public meetings and
public hearings tends to amplify rather than resolve adversary
relationships. Meetings are conducted so that each "side" has
an opportunity to comment. By calling for those in favor,
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then those opposed, public officials delineate the sides in a
conflict and encourage parties to advocate their positions.
The notice requirements for public meetings and public
hearings may not adequately identify "stakeholders" or those
with a real interest in a dispute. Abutters may receive
notice about a variance or special permit, but may never learn
about the proposed rezoning of a small parcel of land in their
neighborhood since notice of hearings on rezones are not
mailed directly to abutters or neighbors. Information of an
opportunity to comment may only appear on official bulletin
boards or printed in local papers under official notices.
Thus, comments may not be received from those who may be
directly affected by the outcome of a decision.
Solutions may be generated by one group: the decision-
making body acting in the interest of all the affected
parties. The weight of problem-solving rests with that group
which must try to balance competing interests. Other times,
the ability of the developer to lobby the proper individuals
may influence decisions.
In cases where notices of an upcoming public hearing do
not reach all interested parties, these individuals may never
have an opportunity to raise important issues. Decision-
making bodies may wish to address their own interests. Often,
lawyers representing developers or community groups will seize
upon attention-grabbing issues while more important concerns
of the parties receive little, if any, attention. Thus, the
decisions may inappropriately or inadequately reflect concerns
of parties.
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The zoning administrative process may fail to provide a
structure in which all interested parties can participate
directly to address their concerns. The current system may be
adequate to resolve some conflicts, but at other times, the
system leads to inefficient and inadequate interactions.
Decisions resulting from such interactions may become highly
controversial in that the interests of some parties may be
addressed, while others are neglected. The following chapter
documents the problems of interactions in the zoning process.
18
CHAPTER TWO
CASE STUDY: ARLINGTON, MASSACHUSETTS
The following case illustrates the procedural steps
involved in filing a rezoning application, participating in a
review by local authorities as well as public hearings, and
accepting the decisions made by a public body. I evaluate
these stages demonstrated in this case study to draw general
conclusions about faults in the zoning administrative process.
This case study does not necessarily typify all zoning
administrative processes; rather it illustrates some of the
potential problems resulting from the nature of the
interactions among parties in some zoning processes.
The case examines a proposed rezoning in Arlington,
Massachusetts, a town of 60,000 north of Boston, over
proposals for developing an old garbage dump. A local
developer submitted a plan to build 260 condominium units on
an eighteen acre site owned by multiple different parties.
The zoning approval process ignited community interest in
maintaining the land for a park and stimulated a heated debate
among public official, members of various public boards,
residents and the developer.
Community interest in the reuse of the Arlington landfill
site dates back to the early 1970's. At that time the town
studied a series of development options for the site. Prior
to this, between 1960 and 1970, the town had entered into an
agreement with the private owners and had used the site as a
landfill. By 1969, with the site filled to capacity, the land
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reverted to the original owners. In 1972, the Arlington
Redevelopment Board, Arlington's Planning Board and
Redevelopment Agency, undertook a study to determine
development potential for a public facility on the site.(l)
In 1974, members of Town Meeting rejected a proposal to use
the site for the town yard (a place to store snow plows and
town equipment).(2) At that point the Redevelopment Board
reevaluated the opportunities to use the site and, with the
agreement of the Board of Selectmen, the Redevelopment Board
put on hold all public development proposals concerning the
landfill. The two boards took the position that the land
should remain vacant unless it could be assembled by a
developer and dealt with as a single development project.(3)
Community. interest in the site continued through the
years. In 1976, the Department of Planning and Community
Development issued a report outlining a series of development
alternatives. The report highly recommended using the site
for public open space, although it also noted a medium density
apartment complex might also be appropriate.(4) After the
study was released, the town took no affirmative steps towards
development of a public park or recreational facility. The
town thwarted various private attempts (including proposals by
the owners themselves) to develop the parcel because of an
inability to assemble the separate parcels from the multiple
owners.(5) Consequently, the large open space became, by
default, an eye sore as the local junkyard.
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A. FILING THE APPLICATION
After almost a year of private meetings with town
officials and citizens, a local developer finally submitted a
petition for rezoning the site.(6) Familiar with the
property, the developer, an Arlington resident, conducted
preliminary studies of the site in 1970, proposing it for
development as a shopping center. This proposal never
progressed beyond the conceptual phase. Returning to the
town in the spring of 1984, the developer presented a new site
proposal for residential development.(7) His plan covered the
entire 18 acres with 279 garden style apartments surrounded by
parking on the perimeter and a wall to enclose the entire
development.
From his first interaction with the town, the developer
identified potential items of conflict. In the spring of 1984
the town planner, who met initially with the developer,
emphasized that the town would be unwilling to rezone the land
on a piecemeal basis although they would be willing to
consider a project involving the entire 18 acres. He also
indicated there would be a strong community interest in a
portion of the site being developed for public use. In
response to these suggestions, the developer acquired
additional adjacent parcels to increase his total project
acreage. This led to creation of a new site plan retaining
the same number of units but including an area for public open
space.(8)
The developer also met with community groups to determine
their concerns with the proposal. Primarily, neighbors
21
worried about increases in traffic in their neighborhood, the
impact on an already overused sewer system, and the change in
the nature of their single family neighborhood with the
construction of apartments and townhouses.
Not until late January 1985, did the developer formally
file a petition to rezone the property. His petition proposed
to increase the zoning from single family to a higher density
to allow construction of garden apartments and townhouses. In
accordance with statutory requirements, the Board of Selectmen
included the proposal on the warrant for Town Meeting in March
1985. Two months remained for various boards to review the
petition and for the Redevelopment Board to hold a public
hearing and issue its recommendation to the Town Meeting.
From the beginning, the developer recognized the need to
comply with community requests. The -advice of the town
planner indicated that an unwillingness to respond to public
concerns could lead to denial of the rezone by town meeting or
later denial of a special permit by the Redevelopment Board.
The developer sought ways to work with the town to incorporate
their concerns into the final plan. He established a rapport
with the various parties, indicating he would be willing to be
flexible in order to gain their support.
B. REVIEW OF APPLICATION
Immediately following submission of the application, the
developer asked for a preliminary review session with the
Redevelopment Board. This body would not only issue a
recommendation to Town Meeting, but would later be the
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decision-making body for any special permit requests. At this
meeting in early February, the developer asked for a response
to his plan. The board members offered numerous suggestions
and raised concerns related to the dangers of toxic waste on
the site, developer responsibility for problems resulting from
development, aesthetics of the site plan, and inclusion of
open space.(9)
Recognizing the importance of the Redevelopment Board's
opinion, the developer immediately addressed each of the
issues raised at the review session. After the meeting, the
developer met with a member of the board, an architect, to
design a new site plan. The new plan reduced the number of
units, mixed garden style apartments with townhouses, reduced
the amount of surface parking, added trees and shrubs as a
buffer around the perimeter, and showed an area for open
space.
Prior to the public hearing the developer organized
individual meetings with neighbors, members of Town Meeting,
and the Conservation Commission in which he elicited other
reactions to the site plan. Neighbors expressed concern about
drainage and flooding onto their property, building heights,
and the level Qf density. The Conservation Commission
emphasized its concerns about potential impacts on wetlands
and rejected the developer's suggestions that he would create
"new" wetlands to compensate for construction on the existing
area. Members of Town Meeting, among other things, objected
to a wall around the project which they felt created an
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exclusive community that would alienate neighbors.(10)
Throughout this review period, the developer tried to respond
to the concerns of the neighbors and public officials by
altering his site plan. During a two month period he offered
three different plans, each responding to issues raised at the
public meetings.
Upon commencement of the zoning process, the developer
hired as his counsel a local attorney. As a past member of
the Arlington Board of Selectmen the attorney understood local
politics. Familiar with some of the techniques of mediation
and dispute resolution, the attorney tried to apply these
principles during the various meetings with public officials
and neighbors. At each meeting he made lists of comments by
the audience and tried to respond immediately by altering the
plans to incorporate their ideas.(11) He also tried to
include important parties (particularly board members) in the
design process. Most important, he tried to establish trust
between the parties and the developer; he continuously stated
the willingness of his client to respond to community
interests.
These efforts lacked an important ingredient - the
ability to bring all the parties together at one general
meeting where no one party would be in control. Separate
meetings had the potential to generate further distrust.
Parties did not know what might be discussed at the other
meetings. Meanwhile, the developer continued to change his
site plan.
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C. PUBLIC HEARING
In early March, the Redevelopment Board held its public
hearing to review the rezoning request. Notices went out to
abutters as well as to all concerned local agencies and
planning departments of neighboring towns and cities. Counsel
for the developer presented the proposal at the public
hearing. After briefly d'escribing the project, he proceeded
to address each of the problems raised by different parties at
each of the earlier meetings. He concluded with an assurance
to the public that the developer intended to be responsive to
community needs. Following the developer's presentation,
community members commented on the proposal. Major concerns
raised at the hearing focused on traffic impact, wetlands
protection, and the neighborhood's status as a single-family
area. When there were no more questions or comments, the
Chairman of the Board formally closed the public hearing and
indicated that the Board would take the request under
advisement.(12)
A week later, at its regular meeting, the Redevelopment
Board issued a recommendation supporting the rezoning on
certain conditions. In their words, "this area should be
rezoned by town meeting in order to provide an opportunity for
more detailed plans and specifications leading to the
improvement of this blighted area."(13) The board recommended
rezoning from R-1 (single family detached dwellings) to the
higher density R-5 (single-family detached dwelling, duplex
house, three family dwelling, townhouses, and apartment
houses). The developer's original petition asked for an even
25
higher density. The Board rejected that request because they
wanted to guarantee that the nature of the project would not
change once a less restrictive rezone came into effect. As
the Chair of the Redevelopment Board commented, if the project
should fall apart after rezoning, the land could be subdivided
and two family and three family properties could be developed
on the site.(14) Therefore, the Board added the condition to
the recommendation; that zoning be restricted to townhouses
and garden apartments and prohibited for any other uses.
The Board also wrote into the recommendation a warning to
the developer; even after rezone approval, public officials or
neighbors could still have an impact on the project. The
Board noted that the developer would be required to submit
much more indepth studies of the project to satisfy community
concerns.(15) This qualified support for- the project signaled
to the community, other public boards, and the developer that
the review process had not ended. While the developer
received a green light to proceed, the community would still
be able to influence the nature of the project. The
Redevelopment Board formally submitted this recommendation to
Town Meeting members before the final vote.
The close of the public hearing signified the end of
face-to-face interactions between neighbors, board and
developer until the Town Meeting three weeks later. Community
members could only wait and hope the recommendations by the
Board would incorporate their comments and concerns. The
format of the hearing did little to encourage the parties to
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interact and explore their concerns further. The developer
had opportunities to respond to questions and comments, but
concerned parties were not made a part of the decision-making
process. In addition, as the meeting was run by the
Redevelopment Board, those in attendance were bound by the
Board's procedural process. In effect, comments made to the
Board seemed to encourage parties to develop adversary
positions and coalitions.
D. MAKING A DECISION
Unbeknownst to the developer, a final crucial conflict
emerged after the Redevelopment Board hearing and prior to
Town Meeting. It was revealed that the Parks and Recreation
Commission had hoped to use the open space promised by the
developer as a. soccer field. Without a firm committment from
the developer to provide useable open space, certain
individuals vowed to block approval of the project. The most
vocal parties let their opinions be known to the Redevelopment
Board and Board of Selectmen. These individuals complained
bitterly of being left out of the decision-making process.
Although they had received a formal notice and had been given
a chance to comment on the project at the public hearing, they
failed to act.(16) The developer had never met directly with
any members of the Parks and Recreation Commission while
preparing the site plan.
After long and emotional testimonies for and against the
project, by a narrow margin, Town Meeting members voted down
the zoning request. Following the meeting, the developer and
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his counsel interviewed those who had opposed the amendment to
discover what issues had not been addressed. At this point
the issue of the soccer field surfaced. Members of the Parks
and Recreation Commission had effectively lobbied other
members of Town Meeting to oppose the rezone until they
received a guarantee for use of the open space as a soccer
field.
Subsequently, the developer was given a second chance on
the amendment. Before the close of the meeting, one member
who voted against the amendment called for reconsideration of
the issue, a procedural move allowed under Massachusetts Town
Meeting by-laws.(17) The new vote, set for 3 days later, gave
the developer time to meet with the opposition to develop a
compromise.(18)
With little time left, the parties reached agreement.(19)
At the second town meeting, the developer presented his
proposal with a public statement of his commitment to public
open space. Out of a total of 2.75 acres of proposed open
space, he promised 1.5 acres would be developed for
recreational purposes. The language of the original amendment
was not altered; the developer merely made a verbal promise to
appease his opposition. That evening, a two-thirds majority
of Town Meeting members voted approval of the requested zoning
amendment.(20)
Two major faults in the process stand out as possible
reasons for the petitioners initial failure at Town Meeting.
In the first place, the developer inaccurately assumed he had
spoken to all the important and influential parties and
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addressed their concerns. He knew nothing about the Parks and
Recreation Commission's concerns until it was almost too late.
Had there existed better channels of communications among the
parties, the developer could have included this party earlier
in discussion to avoid a potentially serious conflict.
A second problem stems from the lack of understanding by
Town Meeting voting members about petitions for rezones. They
were asked to address the issue of whether or not the zoning
on that piece of land should be altered from the stated zoning
ordinance. Instead, the members seemed to address the issue
of whether or not they approved of specific aspects of a
project to be developed on that site; an issue addressed
through the special permit process. This distinction between
these two issues complicated the ability of Town Meeting
members to make a decision.
In Arlington, the permit process for a project like the
one in this case involves two steps; rezoning (these requests
are decided by Town Meeting), and special permits (these are
granted by the Redevelopment Board). Some communities have
overcome this dual decision process by designating a single
public body as the decision-makers for both zoning processes.
Thus, votes on one issue automatically affecting the second
issue are not artificially separated when the overall decision
concerns a specific project. In Arlington, however, the dual
system complicates and prolongs the decision-making process.
E. ANALYSIS
By examining the way in which specific process issues
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were addressed in the Arlington, I draw general conclusions
about faults in the zoning administrative process. First I
examine issues of fairness and efficiency. Later I will
discuss other aspects of the process; whether crucial parties
are included; whether important information is shared among
the parties; and whether the process enhanced relationships
among the parties.
1. Fairness and Efficiency
To evaluate the Arlington rezone case study, it is
necessary to question whether the process led to a fair and
efficient result? To answer this question, I begin by looking
at what each party expected expected. The developer
hoped to receive a quick decision that would grant the zoning
approval and pave the way for the next step, the special
permit process. Town officials wanted to encourage private
development of the entire parcel yet retain a certain portion
for public open space. Neighborhood residents wanted a
project with a minimum negative impact on their neighborhood
but which would be an improvement over the current junkyard.
The Parks and Recreation Commission wanted to be sure the
rezone would guarantee them space for recreational purposes.
The final approved rezone addressed some but not all of
the interests of these parties. The developer received his
rezone, town officials received a guarantee of 1.5 acres open
space, the Parks and Recreation Commission received a verbal
commitment to recreational space and the abutting residents
were guaranteed an opportunity to influence the nature of the
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final project as it moved into the special permit process.
However, these results did not indicate success in the
overall permitting process. One month later the parties
confronted one another again in the special permit process.
Over the next few months it became clear that the rezone
approval had not addressed many of the concerns of the major
parties. In fact, the conflicts among the parties reemerged
with greater intensity. When the developer retracted his
commitment to recreational space, members of the Parks and
Recreation Commission and the Redevelopment Board threatened
to use court action to enforce the promise.
The problems which arose in the special permit process
raise questions as to whether the initial decision to rezone
the property was arrived at in a fair and efficient manner.
Based on the controversies which emerged in the special permit
process, I believe there were serious flaws in the rezone
process. The original amendment seemed to inadequately
address concerns of both the neighbors and the Parks and
Recreation Commission. Consequently, serious stumbling blocks
emerged in the special permit process which dragged on for
another five months with delay. Although the Parks and
Recreation Commission and neighborhood residents generally
supported the proposal to use the vacant land, they did not
approve of specific aspects of the proposal and wanted their
interests included in the plans.
What happened throughout the months of meetings and
hearings that led to this less than satisfactory result? It
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is my thesis that there are deficiencies the process which
tend to encourage conflicts. I will support this by examining
various process considerations; whether important parties are
included, whether information is shared, whether the process
encourages efforts to seek mutually satisfactory agreements,
and whether ongoing relationships are improved.
2. Including Parties
Inclusion of important parties to the dispute is an
important process issue. If parties are left out of the
process they may feel their interests and concerns have not
been addressed. Therefore, they may challenge a decision
which may lead to a lengthy litigation process. In Arlington,
the developer and his counsel tried very hard to identify and
meet with all parties which could potentially be affected by
the decision. The failure to identify the members of the
Parks and Recreation Commission nearly upset the entire rezone
process and set the stage for the ensuing battles for the
special permit process.
3. Sharing Information
. Once all parties have been brought into the process it is
essential for parties to share information in order to form a
stable agreement. The structure of the meetings held by the
public board and the developer made it difficult for the
parties to learn about each others concerns and search for
mutually satisfactory solutions to the problems. For example,
had the developer met with neighbors, the Parks and Recreation
representatives, and local officials in a joint meeting, he
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may have discovered a way to join the interest in useable
space with attention to the neighbors concerns for retaining
the quality of their neighborhood.
Instead, at the public meeting, the Redevelopment Board
sat as the authority reviewing all comments. The Board gave
the public a limited opportunity to raise questions and make
comments. At the community meeting, the neighbors aired their
concerns but never directly confronted the public officials.
Sometimes these meetings generated overlapping or conflicting
problems. At one meeting the developer learned of the
neighbors concern about a playfield in their neighborhood
which might turn into a youth "hangout" for drinking. At
another meeting the Parks and Recreation expressed their
interest in a soccer field. This left the developer in a
precarious position-of trying to satisfy competing interest
without alienating the parties.
Efforts made earlier in the review process to identify
all the important parties and bring them together at the same
time and place could have eliminated the growing controversy.
This lack of true interaction between the parties resulted in
two problems. First, the parties developed even stronger
positions at each of these meetings which enhanced adversary
rather than problem solving relationships. Second, there were
no opportunities for the parties to develop mutually agreeable
solutions. By meeting only with one board member (the
architect), the developer's revised site plan responded to
board concerns, and not necessarily community ones.
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4. Continuing Relationships
The formation of ongoing relationships is another process
consideration. It was important for the Arlington developer
to continue to interact with the various parties. As noted by
the Redevelopment Board, approval of the rezone had no bearing
on approval of the special permit process. During review of
the permit review application, relationships developed in the
rezone process came into play. Those who had been included
earlier joined the efforts to work out new proposals. Those
who were left out or felt their interests were not addressed
distrusted the parties and continued to block the project.
Arlington represents a single isolated case. While every
development dispute and zoning debate is different involving
different parties, issues and concerns, there are common
aspects. of the administrative process which may be identified.
These process issues provide a basis for understanding where
problems may lie in the current zoning administrative process.
These problems may include: the exclusion of important
parties, the lack of or access to information and, the lack of
a forum for enhancing relationships between potentially
adversary groups. The remainder of this paper identifies
procedural innovations that respond to these potential in the
current administrative process.
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CHAPTER THREE
MEDIATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION TECHNIQUE
Traditionally, parties resort to ad hoc negotiations,
like the ones described in the Arlington case, or lawsuits to
resolve controversies over zoning. But these processes may
fail to produce fair and efficient result. For example, a
negotiated agreement between a developer and local government
may be successfully challenged in court by a neighborhood
group not included in designing the agreement. Alternatively,
a developer may file a law suit for denial of a permit that
results in a judgment against a developer. Thus, a project
involving considerable time and money may be derailed.
Alternative procedures to improve the quality of decision-
making may address some of the problems with the current
processes that lead to unsatisfactory results.
With ever greater frequency developers are engaging in ad
hoc negotiations with both local governments and community
groups over development proposals.(1) That is, zoning is not
a passive administrative process in which developers apply for
approval of a project that conforms to defined standards set
forth in a zoning manual. Today, projects are much more
complex. Since the 1970's local governments have imposed more
rigid land use regulations as the amount of developable land
diminishes. At the same time, those with the power to make
zoning decisions have invented new ways to encourage
development while retaining control over the regulatory
process. Examples of such zoning devices include Planned Unit
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Developments, floating zones, and Transfer of Development
Rights.(2) As a result, developers and local governments
negotiate agreements on a case by case basis that are then
enforced through the zoning process. The conditions added to
the Arlington rezone exemplify this trend.
This process of negotiation allows an exchange between
the public and private sectors. Local governments may now use
the regulatory process to influence details of a development
project. Developers have discovered that cooperation with the
government may lead to shorter administrative processes, less
delays, and less risk of litigation.(3)
But, interactions between government and developer must
also account for community groups who may have strong
political clout and affect the outcome of a decision.
Neighbors, like the ones in Arlington, will be directly
affected by approval of a development project. Other citizen
groups may have interests in the site such as with the
Arlington Parks and Recreation Commission and their interest
in a community soccer field. An agreement reached between a
local government and developer that does not address the
concerns of these other parties may become very controversial.
At the public hearing, opposition may be very vocal and
influence the opinions of the decision-makers to deny a zoning
request. Alternatively, once approved, community groups may
file suit to halt a project.
Thus, developers have discovered the importance of
working with the community to ensure support for a project.(4)
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Techniques used by individual developers range from slick
publicity campaigns to organized meetings with the community
to discuss the project and discover controversial issues for
the neighbors.(5) Meetings conducted by the developer in
Arlington exemplify the concept meeting with community
members. In an Urban Land Institute handbook called Working
with the Community: A Developer's Guide, the authors state
that "the aims of these early efforts should be to educate the
community about the project, to identify critical issues, and
to offer the chance to work out issues before they erupt at
hearings."(6)
But often times these discussions fail to address the
concerns of community groups. Citizens are excluded from the
actual decision-making process; they merely comment on a
finalized agreement. In Arlington the developer and
Redevelopment Board worked dlosely to design new site plans
which the community groups responded to but did not help, to
create. Because they were not directly included in the
process, issues of concern were not incorporated into the
plans. In that case, the developer could address major
concerns at the last moment and save the proposal. But in
other circumstances there may be no opportunities for a final
compromise.
Dissatisfied with a decision by the local permit granting
authority or city council, parties will frequently turn to the
court system for redress. In their book Environmental Dispute
Resolution, Wheeler and Bacow describe how decisions in
environmental cases rendered by a judge tend to be of a "win -
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lose" nature and emphasize the procedural rather than
substantive merits of a dispute.(7) Neighbors who are
dissatisfied with proposals for a nearby shopping center, for
example, may win their case in court on a procedural issue,
such as failure to provide adequate notice of a public
hearing, when the real issue is community concern overtraffic
impacts. Whether parties use litigation to effectively stall
a project, gain permission to proceed, or set a precedent, a
legal decision does little towards resolving a conflict such
as how to mitigate traffic congestion from a new development.
A. DEFINITION OF MEDIATION
Ad hoc negotiation and litigation as models for dispute
resolution are sometimes inadequate for addressing the problems
they set out to resolve. Meanwhile, the structure of the
zoning process could be enhanced in-various ways to improve
both the quality of communication and durability of an
agreement. In recent years, a wide spectrum of techniques
have been proposed and instituted by those with an interest in
more effective and efficient means to solve conflicts.(8)
This paper will focus on one of these methods, mediation.
Mediation is a form of negotiation where a heutral third
person assists the parties in a dispute.(9) It is defined by
John McCrory in his article "Environmental Mediation- Another
Piece for the Puzzle," (10) as "one of several mechanisms
available to disputants who wish to use a neutral to assist in
achieving settlement." Important.elements of mediation
according to Lawrence Susskind are the ability to create an
38
outcome that is 1) considered fair by all the parties to the
dispute, 2) reached in an efficient manner, and 3) remains
stable after the negotiations are completed.(ll) Crucial to
such a result is the mediator whose most important
characteristics include 1) a potential to maintain procedural
flexibility unavailable to judges or decision-makers that may
change with each new situation, 2) an ability to encourage
communications between parties without violating ex parte
rules or impairing confidentiality, 3) an ability to
communicate with parties and make substantive suggestions for
resolution of the dispute.(12)
Mediation offers a structured approach to what currently
occurs in an ad hoc fashion during the zoning process of small
parcels. With. this technique important parties are identified
and brought together face-to-face in a neutral atmosphere to
explore interests and concerns. This could address the
inadequacies of the hearing process by including all groups in
the formulation of a decision. The mediator helps the
developer, citizens groups, and local government officials
focus on substantive areas of the conflict in order to move
beyond traditional negotiating methods of positional
bargaining or "horse-trading." The parties will search for
creative solutions for a development dispute that address
multiple interests instead of a "win" for one party and a
"lose" for another.(13)
B. GENERIC STEPS IN MEDIATION
Each development dispute will be different - the issues
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and parties both change - and the decision-making process
should be flexibile to respond to these changes. Mediated
negotiation would provide a framework for this type of
interactions. The mediator helps establish working
relationships among the parties and assists in creation of
procedural guidelines for joint exploration of alternative
solutions to conflicts. An example of the application of
mediation in zoning disputes may be drawn from the Arlington
case study. Recommendations issued by the Redevelopment Board
to Town Meeting could have been developed from a negotiated
agreement. Prior to the public hearing, the developer 'engaged
in multiple meetings with numerous parties involved in the
dispute. Applying the principles of mediation, an individual
acting as mediator could have played an important role in
bringing together parties, identifying issues and concerns,
and maintaining good channels of communications between the
parties.
As a result of recent efforts to mediate public sector
disputes, Lawrence Susskind developed a theory of mediation
that identifies three standard phases of activities: 1) pre-
negotiation, 2) negotiation and concensus-building, and 3)
post-negotiation.(14) These steps will be applied below to
interactions in a zoning dispute.
1. PHASE ONE
The first phase involves defining the parties and issues
at stake and developing the procedural groundrules and
structure for the actual negotiation sessions.(15) A mediator
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is chosen to help those parties who are identified as
important stakeholders to set an agenda, develop groundrules
for the proceedings, train parties in techniques of
negotiation and gather together information that will assist
the parties to develop a joint solution.
a. Identify the Issues
The first step should be an identification of a potential
conflict in a land use decision. Those who hear the requests
first will be the town planner or the planning board (or
Redevelopment Board in Arlington). When a controversial
proposal crosses their desks, these parties could be the ones
to initiate a mediation effort. The planner in Arlington
received information from all the different parties about
their concerns. When he saw the concerns of the neighbors may
conflict with the plans of the developer, he could have
proposed mediation. Alternatively, at the preliminary meeting
of the Redevelopment Board, the members could have suggested
the developer engage in mediation before trying to submit a
proposal.
b. Choose a Mediator
The next step would be to appoint a mediatior. Many
questions arise as to who would be appropriate in the role of
mediator in land use disputes. A frequent recommendation is
for a member of the local planning staff to be trained for
this part.
In some cases it would be very useful and important for
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the planner to be the neutral party. As a staff person, the
planner often takes a neutral stance in disputes between the
developer and the planning board, zoning board or community
group. She may be the party to initiate discussions and
suggest alternative solutions to problems. At other times the
planner loses her neutrality. Where the planning staff
prepares a recommendation on a proposed project for the
planning board, once an opinion is given by that office, the
planner will no longer appear neutral to other parties. When
questioned about his role, the Director of Planning in
Arlington, believed he should recommend interactions between
the developer and citizens, but he would not participate in
discussions as a mediator if it might jeopardize his
appearance of neutrality for the different parties.(16) In
some circumstances it may be more appropriate for a member of
the planning board to act as mediator in disputes. A board
member may be able to maintain a neutral position and not be
perceived by either the developer or community groups as
taking "sides."
An alternative would be the use of an outsider as
mediator. Someone from outside the community who is trained
in mediation skills and understands the zoning process and
land use issues may be better able to maintain an appearance
of neutrality and thereby capable of developing the confidence
of all the parties.(17) If hired by one party or another,
neutrality may be lost as other parties may believe the
mediator is biased in favor of the hiring party. Frequently,
the mediator will be chosen by consensus of all the the
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parties to ensure mutual acceptance.
A number of organizations around the country offer
professional mediation services. The trained mediators will
charge a fee for their services which may range from simply
facilitating at the actual negotiating sessions, to actively
participating in organizational details and information
gathering for the sessions. The individual playing the role
of mediator may be determined based on the type of dispute,
the important parties to be involved in the mediation effort,
and the appearance of neutrality of that individual in that
role.
c. Identify the Parties
Once the mediator is chosen, the important parties in the
dispute should be identified and contacted about participation
in the mediation effort. A good place for a mediator to begin
in zoning decisions would be with the planning department,
members of the planning board and the developer. After
discussions with these parties, the mediator may start to
recognize who should be included in the negotiations. For
example, a mediator in Arlington would have contacted members
of the Redevelopment Board, members of the Board of Selectmen,
neighbors, the Director of Planning and other public agencies
involved in the development process. Representatives from the
different interest groups would have been asked to join the
negotiation.
The mediator should continue to identify important
parties throughout the process. Arlington demonstrates the
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importance of this ongoing search. When the Parks and
Recreations Commission confronted the Redevelopment Board, a
mediator would have identified this group and its concerns as
important to the process. Therefore, either members of the
Commission would have been drawn into the discussions, or
their major concerns would have been addressed by those
parties directly participating in the negotiations.
d. Develop Procedural Guidelines
A mediator should meet with the participating parties to
develop procedural guidelines and an agenda for the process.
In Arlington, rather than setting up separate meetings for
different groups, the mediator would try to bring together the
major parties at one session to discuss issues and concerns.
Thus, instead of the Redevelopment Board holding a public
meeting where the developer and community groups are
"attendees", a meeting would be held with representatives from
each party; the developer, community groups, Board of
Redevelopment, Board of Selectmen, Parks and Recreation
Commission and all other identified parties. At the first
meeting the parties could become aquainted with one another
and discuss the important issues to be addressed during future
sessions.
The parties may also decide at this first meeting to
impose a time limit for the negotiations. It could be
mutually agreed that if the negotiations do not produce a
result within a specified time, the proposal would revert back
to the traditional process where the public board makes a
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decision. So, for example, if the parties decide to meet once
a week for six weeks and at the end of the sixth week they
have not formulated an agreement, the Planning Board may
continue with its evaluation of the proposal and send a
recommendation to the final decision-making authority.
2. PHASE TWO
During the second phase, parties engage in trading
consessions and commitments.(18) Some of the techniques
suggested at this point include the development of a single
negotiating text, an identification of underlying interests,
and a packaging of these interests into mutually satisfactory
agreements. This leads to the development of a final
negotiating text.
At the negotiation session with a mediator, the parties
would share with one another their interests and concerns
about the project. All the parties would be asked to help
form a mutual list of concerns to be addressed during the
course of the negotiations. In these sessions the parties may
begin to see overlapping issues and areas for compromise. Had
this approach been used in Arlington, the developer would have
heard about the different views about the use of public space;
those who wanted a soccer field and those who preferred unused
open space. In this environment he could begin to make
suggestions and receive immediate responses to his proposals.
Together the parties could have generated a site plan
incorporating the various concerns of the different groups.
Thus, a series of mediated sessions could be used to develop
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an agreement with conditions where the parties negotiate the
details of the conditions.
3. PHASE THREE
During the final phase of mediated negotiations the
agreement is implemented.(19) At this juncture, an agreement
between the parties must be incorporated into an
administrative process to become binding on the parties.
Monitoring of the implementation process is also important at
this stage.
After an agreement is reached between the negotiating
parties, the administrative process may be resumed. Following
the statutory guidelines, the application would be filed and a
public hearing would be held to allow a presentation of the
negotiated agreements followed by public comment. In
Arlington, the proposal would have come before the
Redevelopment Board at their public hearing. Their support
could have led to acceptance of the proposal at Town Meeting.
Once approved by the decision-making body, the negotiated
agreement becomes the zoning decision binding upon the
developer and incumbent upon the local government to enforce
through their regulatory process. For example, if a mediated
agreement in Arlington had created a rezone with the
conditions of restricted types of development and 1.8 acres of
open space, the developer would be required to show the public
space on the site plan before the municipality would grant
final permits to begin construction. In addition, any future
requests to build on that property would be bound by the
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restrictions of the negotiated agreement.
C. FUNDING A MEDIATION
An issue concerning use of mediated negotiation is the
ability to fund such a process. A majority of mediation
efforts in the environmental field have been funded through
private gr'ants from foundations. In other circumstances
where grants or government funding for mediated negotiations
do not exist, parties may be required to contribute for
expenses. The major expenditures for the effort include the
cost of the mediator's time, travel expenses, costs for legal
assistance where necessary, costs for technical assistance,
and costs for the participants time when individuals leave
work to attend negotiating sessions or engage in phone
conversations related to the negotiation at work.
Finding an equitable way to divide the costs where no
outside funding exists may be one of the greatest barriers to
pursuing mediated negotiation as an alternative method of
dispute resolution. The parties may often feel their limited
resources are better spent on litigation. Familiarity with
the court system leads people to avoid taking chances on new
techniques where the outcome may only lead to a later court
challenge.
Each party finds a reason why they should not be
responsible for the costs. A local government may perceive
their role as advisory and the real dispute lies between the
developer and the citizens. They may also claim their limited
resources would be more wisely spent in other ways of greater
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importance, particularly where there is no guarantee
litigation will be avoided. Neighbors or citizen groups
rarely have any resources and even where funds may exist, the
groups believe the responsibility lies with the developer who
has the resources and who is ultimately responsible for the
problem. The developer may feel the idea of citizen
participation should be a government role and any efforts to
include citizens should be government funded.
Promoters of mediated negotiations in other fields have
found a variety of funding sources. Large scale environmental
disputes have frequently relied upon grants from private
foundations interested in financially supporting mediation
efforts. Annexation mediation in Virginia employs an
equitable distribution of costs between the parties to the
dispute. In addition, the legislature established a fund to
assist in costs for mediation, now a legally recognized
technique for resolving annexation disputes between
municipalities.(20) A mediation effort to create a downtown
plan for Denver, Colorado divided the costs between two major
parties to the dispute while other parties contributed their
time and in-kind donations such as supplies and use of spaces
for sessions.(21) The success of these different parties to
fund the efforts suggests there are numerous types of
opportunities for funding of mediated zoning disputes.
D. ANALYSIS
Mediation provides a technique to improve the process of
resolving land use conflicts. The technique addresses many of
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the weaknesses in the Arlington rezone case. Involvement of
the mediator helps to identify and include important parties
in the process. The parties may improve the efficiency of
discussions by agreeing upon a structure and time limit for
sessions. Important issues are addressed by all the parties in
one session. All parties have equal opportunities to raise
concerns and propose solutions to the conf-lict. Thus, in a
mediated negotiation the parties work together to produce- a
mutually satisfactory proposal. Also, this process allows the
parties to develop ongoing relationships and channels of
communications. The following chapter further explores each
of these characteristics in the context of a mediated
negotiation of a local development dispute.
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CHAPTER FOUR
USING MEDIATION IN A ZONING DISPUTE: BLACKSBURG, VA.
In this chapter I will review a successfully mediated
land use dispute. It demonstrates the value of mediation in
the zoning process. In 1983, in the small university town of
Blacksburg, VA., a development dispute erupted when a local
developer applied for zoning approval to build a car wash, gas
station, and convenience store. The proposal reopened old
conflicts between the developer, residents and town officials
- neighbors disliked the impact of the commercial development
on their residential community and the town disliked the
impact of increased congestion on an already busy
thoroughfare. Within the statutorily prescribed rezoning
process, town planners, the developer and concerned citizens
met several times over a five week period with a mediator to
create a binding settlement which was satisfactory to all the
parties, and subsequently approved by the local permit
granting authority.
A. FILING THE APPLICATION
In 1979, the.site in question was purchased as part of a
Planned Unit Development (PUD) that included thousands of
renter and owner-occupied homes and a commercial center.(l)
The PUD owner sold the commercial parcel to a developer who
built a complex with a grocery story, specialty shops and
restaurant.(2) Conflicts arose over this initial development
when neighbors demanded adequate landscape buffering between
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the stores and their homes. Although initially amenable to
the residents' requests, the developer reneged on his
promises. Many residents then charged that town officials had
failed to hold the developer to his committments.(3) No
actions were taken by the town to enforce the earlier
agreement and the neighbors tired of demanding performance by
the developer.
Three years later in 1983, with the center facing
financial difficulties, the developer proposed additions to
the development of a car wash, gas station, and convenience
store in order to attract more customers.(4) These new
requests rekindled the old debates. Abutting neighbors
balked at the idea of a late night gas station and convenience
store. They feared these alterations would create all night
traffic congestion, noise, and bright lights at night.(5)
Town officials objected to the proposed curb cuts for the site
which they felt would aggravate traffic problems on the
congested throughfare. They also raised concerns about
vehicular circulation on the site, the economic feasibility of
the proposed development, and design issues related to the gas
station.(6)
All building permits and permits to change the hours of
operation for the shopping center site required approval of
both the town Planning Commission and the Town Council.(7)
Therefore, in order to proceed with construction, the
developer needed to file his plans through a statutory
process. Once permit requests were filed, the permit would be
as follows: The Planning Commission would hold a public
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hearing and then issue a recommendation on the project to the
Town Council. The Town Council would then consider the
recommendation, hold another public hearing, and vote on the
proposal.(8) Recognizing the town's reluctance to approve the
permits, the developer threatened to sue in order to proceed
with the development.(9)
The town considered several alternatives over resolving
the growing conflict. The Town Planning Director suggested
using mediated negotiation to reach an agreement by consensus.
He had learned about the dispute resolution technique at a
recent conference and thought.it would be applicable in this
situation. (10)
Although the developer had a legal right to develop
commercial uses on the property, the town maintained the
authority to deny building permits and changes in hours of-
operations. Nevertheless, the town knew their authority to
restrict hours of operation through the zoning process rested
on questionable legal grounds that could be challenged in
court. Usually municipalities may not impose restrictions on
hours of operation through zoning regulations.(ll) Therefore,
they hoped to resolve the conflict in a way that would improve
their rapport with the neighbors while finding a solution to
satisfy the developer and avoid the expensive and time
consuming process of litigation.(12)
. On the other hand, the developer knew that by threatening
to take legal action he might be able to push the town towards
granting approval of the permits. However, he did not want to
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destroy possibilities for a continuing relationship with the
town. In addition, a court judgement in his favor and
completion of the new additions would cause friction with the
neighbors who represented an important part of his
customers.(13)
Neighbors let it be known they intended to stand up for
their rights this time. They wanted assurance from the town
that there would be no further development difficulties on the
site. They recognized litigation would not necessarily
include them in the decision-making process - an important
issue becaue that would allow them to have more say in the
future of the site.(14)
B. REVIEW PROCESS - MEDIATION
Realizing. that the key parties were interested in trying
to solve their dispute through mediation, the town Planning-
Director contacted two mediators from the Institute for
Environmental Negotiation, a non-profit organization at the
University of Virginia, who agreed to assess the potential for
a negotiation effort.(15)
As a first task, the mediators identified the important
parties in the dispute.(16) After several discussions with
residents, the Planning Director and the developer, the
mediator discovered that four major groups were involved - the
town Planning Director, representatives for the neighbors, the
commercial developer, and the PUD Associative Board.(17) This
final party represented the PUD developer and the 6,000
residents of the development. Through a deed restriction for
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the shopping center, the PUD Board retained final approval
over all new development. This Board had already rejected
preliminary proposals for the commercial site and could
potentially veto the developer's plans even if approved by the
town.(18)
Next, the mediators asked each of the parties in
Blacksburg to choose representatives to participate in an
organizational meeting. The president of the neighborhood
association and his board chose three members, the shopping
center developer appointed his project manager, and town
government chose the chair of the Planning Commission, the
Director of Planning, and the planner responsible for issuing
the approval. The PUD developer came to the first meetings to
represent the PUD association and later replaced himself with
a staff member.(19)
Due to the various parties' apprehensions about engaging
in the negotiation process, the mediators helped the parties
draft a "participation agreement" that set conditions for the
sessions that would follow.(20) The town agreed that even if
negotiations substantially revised the site plan, the
developer would not be required to file a new application.
The developer agreed to negotiate plans for all three
remaining undeveloped commercials parcels instead of limiting
discussions to the one parcel containing the new development.
The neighbors agreed to publicly support any agreement
generated by the negotiations. The PUD Association agreed to
make a good faith effort to negotiate for the needs of the
entire PUD development, not just for the residential portion.
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The parties all signed this statement of mutual agreement.(21).
With the participation agreement in place, each party in
the mediation had a different reason for continuing with the
effort. While the Blacksburg developer felt he should not be
required to discuss his development plans with the neighbors,
he also realized his participation in the negotiation could
speed up the permit approval process, saving him both time and
money. The town could forsee a long court battle with a high
probability of defeat and a major committment of resources for
litigation. For the neighbors, the negotiation provided their
opportunity to take an active part in formulating policies to
govern future development of the site.(22)
During the first meeting the parties agreed to logistical
groundrules to. govern all further sessions. They decided to
limit.the sessions to a five week period - a restriction that
coincided with the deadline for the Planning Commission to
issue its approval of the permit.(23) Each team presented its
individual concerns and together the group tried to find ways
to "package" issues and compromise in different areas. The
parties discovered some issues could be addressed immediately,
while the more difficult areas were left for later
discussions.(24)
At the end of the five negotiation sessions, each one
usually two or three hours in length, the parties agreed to a
12 point settlement. Among the points of agreement, the
residents and representatives for the PUD developer agreed to
speak in support of the proposed development before the
55
Planning Commission and Town Council. The town agreed to
amend the town zoning ordinance to conform with areas of
agreement reached through the negotiation. The town also
granted the requested traffic revisions for the site. In
return, the developer agreed to reduce the size of the car
wash, maintain specific hours of operation, and add buffers to
shield the abutting neighbors from the new development.
Furthermore, he agreed to a five year moratorium on requests
to extend hours of operation.(25)
C. PUBLIC HEARING AND THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
Next, the developer submitted the negotiated settlement
to the proper chain of authorities for their approval. The
approval process involved two parts. The first step required
an issuance of a recommendation by the Environmental Quality
and Land Use Subcommittee of the full Planning Commission.(26)
The parties jointly presented the signed negotiated settlement
at the public meeting and spoke in favor of the process by
which they had an agreement. After receiving approval of the
Subcommittee, the plan went on to its second step - review by
the full Planning Commission. As required by statute, the
Commission held a public hearing to elicit community response
to the proposal. Later, the Commission issued a
recommendation in support of the project to the Town Council.
At their next meeting the Town Council unanimously voted
approval of the project.(27)
Although the Planning Commission approved the agreement
and sent on a recommendation to Town Council, support was not
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unanimous. In fact, members of the Commission felt excluded
from the agreement and sought to stall its approval. In the
final vote of the subcommittee, two favored the proposal, one
opposed and one abstained. Additionally, the town manager did
not support the final agreement.(28) One of the mediators
commented that this lack of support came from a failure to
maintain ongoing communication between those involved in the
process and other Commission members and town officials. The
mediator suggested that a different composition of the town
mediating teams and better channels of communication might
have corrected this flaw.(29)
An ad hoc negotiation between the town and developer in
Blacksburg would have left out the community groups who may
have in turn filed suit to challenge the town's decision.
Consequently, a s'uccessful court challenge would have upset
any agreement reached between the developer and town. By
contrast, the mediated agreement drew together support from
all the participating parties. The Blacksburg mediators
ensured this cooperation through their "participation
agreement" and signatures on the final agreement, and later by
orchestrating a joint presentation to the Planning Commission.
In Blacksburg the specific nature of the agreements led
to assurance of implementation. The approved zoning
agreement, legally binding on that parcel included the
specific conditions developed in the mediation sessions.
Also, to enforce the restrictions on hours of operation the
town revised the zoning ordinance. Different techniques may
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be used to ensure compliance. One of these, private covenants
recorded in municipal land records, has been used to enforce
an agreement and bind it with the land. Although usually not
policed for compliance, a covenant will be binding in a court
of law if there is a breach in the agreement.(30) Another
technique is to make statutory changes based on the agreement
as in the Blacksburg Agreement.
D. ANALYSIS
I use this case study to explore the value of mediation
in the zoning administrative process. At first glance it may
not seem obvious that the Blacksburg process improved upon the
traditional procedure as characterized by the Arlington case
study. Indeed, in both cases the developer received his
permit approval, the local government protected its interest
in public improvements (in Arlington it was public open space,
and -in Blacksburg it was control over traffic patterns on the
major thoroughfare), and the community groups felt their
interests were addressed by the agreements. The outcome in
Blacksburg, however, proved much more stable. The parties in
Blacksburg jointly presented the agreement to Town Council
where they received unanimous approval and ultimately saw the
project built. By contrast, the shakey rezone agreement in
Arlington fell apart during the special permit process. In
order to salvage it the parties formed new alliances, made
compromises, held numerous new negotiations and faced the
threat of ending up in court.
Although it may be difficult to draw generalizations from
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two case studies, there are lessons that can be learned
from both the Blacksburg and Arlington cases. In Blacksburg
the parties engaged in a process, mediated negotiation, which
in many ways addressed the deficiencies evident in the
Arlington example.
If the Blacksburg case, in contrast with Arlington,
demonstrates an improvement, of fairness and efficiency in the
zoning process, what occurred in Blacksburg that was missing
in Arlington?
1. Efficiency
The Blacksburg mediator brought the parties together in a
series of five meetings to develop an agreement. Within three
months the developer had his permit and all the parties felt
satisfied with. the result. By contrast, the ad hoc
negotiation and series of separate meetings held in the
Arlington case, (which may have been required given the
controversial nature of this project), drew out the process
over a period of nine months for the rezone and special permit
processes combined. Negotiations may have satisfied some but
not all of the parties. Those who were left out might have
felt their only option to alter the decision was to file suit.
Had the developer or community group taken legal action
against the town, litigation could have lasted a least six
months - and more likely over a year. Not only would there
have been an increased delay to the development, the costs of
legal fees for all the parties would have been extensive.
2. Fairness
59
Fairness is more difficult to quantify than efficiency.
For the sake of this discussion I will focus on whether the
contents of the mediated agreement addressed the interests of
each party. The negotiated agreement in Blacksburg not only
addressed the major concerns of each participant, but it also
demonstrated how the parties worked together to find mutually
satisfactory solutions.
Another strong indicator of fairness in the Blacksburg
case was that all the parties came before Town Council and
jointly lobbied for final approval. Had interests not been
adequately addressed, the parties may not have been -willing to
show unified support for the proposal. Furthermore, the lack
of criticism from the community at the public hearing may
suggest important concerns were addressed. By contrast, as
soon as the developer began the special permit phase in
Arlington, controversies reemerged and those partie's which
felt excluded from the earlier "agreement" tried to block the
project.
To understand the important differences between the
Blacksburg and Arlington cases, I turn to the process
considerations identified in Chapters One and Two and evaluate
how mediated negotiation addressed each one. These
considerations were; whether the process included important
parties, whether the parties shared information to produce
results, whether the process encouraged the parties to seek
mutually satisfactory agreements, and whether the parties
developed ongoing relationships.
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3. Included Parties
The first issue, including important parties in process
of creating an agreement, is an important part of the
mediation process. I.n the Blacksburg case, it was the
mediators who discovered a fourth important party - the PUD
Association - to be included in the negotiation. Excluded
from the process, this party had the authority to undermine
any agreement reached between the other parties. Therefore,
drawing them into the discussions was critical to the outcome.
The mediators recognized the need to include this fourth
party. At their suggestion, the other parties agreed to
include the PUD.
In a traditional zoning process without the assistance of
a mediator it may have been much more difficult for the
participating parties to identify this fourth party. For
example, no one in Arlington took the initiative to include
the Parks and Recreation Commission in discussions. Concerned
primarily with finding a solution, the affected parties often
cannot stand back from the process to evaluate issues such as
identifying groups which may be missing from the discussions.
More importantly, the parties may not feel. they have the
authority to make such a decision. When a mediator is
present, she often has the express authority to take the
necessary actions to identify and include important parties.
4. Packaging Isues with Shared Information
The second and third important processes in Blacksburg
were the ability of the parties to share information and to
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"package" interests to seek a mutually satisfactory agreement.
During the meetings the parties presented their primary areas
of concern. With the assistance of the mediator they tried to
find overlapping issues.(31) For example, the residents
informed the group of the importance of restrictions on hours
of operation in the back portion of the site. The developer,
less concerned with the back area, wanted extended hours in
the front areas near the highway.(32) By discussing hours of
operations for the two areas simultaneously, the parties found
a solution that addressed both concerns: creation of two zones
for hours of business.(33)
Ad hoc discussions between the developer and the town may
not have resulted in such a creative response to the problem.
For example, the developer in Arlington made special efforts
to meet with different parties, discover their concerns, and
incorporate these issues into his plans. Since there were no
established forums in which parties could listen to each
others concerns, the site plans could not satisfactorily
resolve competing interests. Likewise, had a party appealed
the decision, the finding of a judge would have accepted or
rejected the developer's plan as proposed; there would have
been little if any community imput.
5. Improved Relationships
The final process issue is whether the parties improved
their relationships with one another. As demonstrated by the
Blacksburg case, this is particularly important when the
parties must continue to interact in the future. The parties
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faced the potential of confronting similar issues when the
developer began development of his remaining parcel. As a
result of the mediation effort, the parties felt comfortable
meeting together to resolve their differences. In addition to
the developer's improved rapport with the local government and
neighbors, the Planning Department developed a system to
improve notification to community groups of potentially
controversial land use decisions, and the community
established a working relationship with the local authorities
in order to work together on future land use issues.(34)
Thus, in this case mediation improved relationships between
parties who needed to continue to interact with one another
over time. Providing an environment to develop these
relationships had an important impact on the nature of
immediate and future interactions among the parties.
By contrast, the traditional process, as represented in
the Arlington case, encourages adversary relationships, and
discourages joint problem solving. By the time the Town
Meeting took place in Arlington, various factions had already
taken strong positions on the zoning amendment. Although they
had definite interests in the project, members of the Parks
and Recreation Commission had never directly confronted the
developer about their interest in a soccer field. Later when
the special permit process began, these various parties had
isolated themselves into separate groups - the Redevelopment
Board, the neighbors, and the Parks and Recreation Commission
- each with separate and competing interests in the project.
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During heated meetings of the Redevelopment Board to discuss
the special permit proposal, the groups' distrust for one
another and unwillingness to work together became obvious.
Had the parties been able to meet in a neutral, non-adversary
environment during the earlier stages, they may have been able
to transform this hostility into constructive problem solving.
6. Representation
There are other important aspects of mediation that
respond to deficiencies in the traditional zoning
process. First, those who were present at the mediation in
Blacksburg returned to their constituents to keep them
informed of the decisions made at the mediation sessions.
This process allowed a small group to carry information from
larger groups to the discussion table to be sure the
negotiating parties addressed important concerns. The
traditional process provides limited opportunities for
searching out issues and maintaining contact between
constituents and representatives of these groups. For
example, in the Arlington case, those neighbors who met
directly with the developer spoke about their concerns, but no
system existed for the developer to find out concerns of other
neighbors.
7. Framework
Second, the mediation provided a framework for problem
solving among the parties. Of importance was the set of
jointly developed groundrules. These rules included; a
description of issues to be addressed by the group during the
64
negotiations, a recognized time limit for discussions, a
restriction against press or outsider participation, an
agreement to share all written communications among parties
with all other participants, and an agreement that all parties
would publicly support and explain the agreement. Each of
these rules, difficult if not impossible to administer in the
traditional process, facilitated the parties in their efforts
to find a mutually satisfactory agreement. In the Arlington
case, the parties at the Redevelopment Board hearing
interacted within the guidelines of the Board's procedures.
When the developer sponsored meetings with the community, he
determined the agenda for the discussions. Neither of these
situations could be considered "neutral" for the participants.
8. Funding
An outstanding-question is the ability and willingness to
fund such an effort. In the case of Blacksburg, a grant
covered all the expenses of the meetings and the mediators
efforts. The Virginia Environment Endowment offered the grant
to promote the concept of mediation and use Blacksburg as a
test case. However, grants and government funding are
limited.
Costs of mediation may be limited to covering the expense
of the mediator's time and travel expenses. In the Blacksburg
case, the mediators spent about 16 days in sessions and
preparation for meetings.(35) In other cases, the
negotiations may require much more time by the mediator, and
greater expenses for production of technical information. As
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mentioned in Chapter Three, the parties may not be willing to
expend their limited resources on a process that does not
guarantee an outcome. One source of funding may be the
creation of government matching funds where the local
government contributes a portion and either foundations,
grants or the parties pay the balance of the costs.
Alternatively, the parties may agree to an equitable division
of the costs-. The mediator's expense, when a consultant is
used, could be divided by non-government parties while the
local government offers technical assistance without charge.
Another possible cost reducing technique would be to train
staff members in mediation techniques and make these services
available for parties in a negotiation. Thus, costs of the
effort could be minimized. The major expenses after the
mediator's time would be for the acquisition of technical
information, such as reports or studies, and materials for the
sessions.
In conclusion, the Blacksburg case study seems to be one
example in which mediation provided a useful mechanism by
which to resolve zoning conflicts. However, this example may
not necessarily apply to all other zoning disputes. There are
valuable lessons to be earned, though, particularly by
identifying specific aspects of the process used in Blacksburg
as compared to the process in Arlington. This comparison
demonstrates how potential restrictions on problem solving in
the traditional zoning process could be overcome by the use of
a mediator.
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The important difference between the Blacksburg and the
Arlington processes is the presence of the neutral individual,
the mediator, meeting with parties in dispute in a forum
structured to encourage problem solving. Specific aspects of
this new process explained by the Blacksburg case could
address deficiencies in the traditional procedures as
exemplified in the Arlington case. Furthermore, as a result
of using these techniques, it may be possible to improve both
fairness an increase efficiency of zoning decisions. However,
there are many obstacles in the way of mediation being applied
on a constant basis in zoning. Some of these obstacles,
political and legal, are addressed in the following two
chapters.
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CHAPTER FIVE
LEGAL ISSUES
In this chapter I explore legal questions that might
arise concerning the use of mediation in the zoning
administrative process. In particular, I address two
questions; 1) what legally sanctioned mechanisms exist to bind
parties in a negotiated agreement for a rezone, special permit
or variance, and 2) what are some legal restrictions on the
participation of local government officials in a mediation
session; what are the implications of the Massachusetts Open
Meeting Law and ex parte contacts between government officials
and parties in a zoning decision.
Developing an understanding of these and other legal
issues may be critical to further the idea of mediation as an
innovation in the zoning administrative pr'ocess. An important
reason for this investigation is that participants may be
hesitant to engage in a process where the legal ramifications
are unclear. This section begins to address some of these
issues.
A. POWER TO GRANT CONDITIONS
A critical question about mediated negotiation is whether
an agreement can be enforced. Are there ways to legally
require performance? In the zoning context, once the parties
agree through the mediation process that a parcel of land will
be used in a specified way with certain restrictions, there
needs to be a mechanism to enforce that decision.
This section explains one such tool - the use of
68
conditions - that currently allows local government officials
to tailor approved amendments or permits for the specific
project. A condition is technique by which local governments
may restrict the use of private property. For example, a
developer may request a special permit to erect a building on
a parcel. The local government may restrict the height of the
structure or require special signage or open space around the
building. These restrictions may be enforced through a
"condition" to granting of the permit.
In the.traditional model, the conditions are usually
designed by the government offi-cials, perhaps after
discussions with the developer or community groups. Arlington
exemplifies this trend. After conducting a public hearing,
the Redevelopment Board proposed restrictions to be placed on
the final approved amendment.
The product of a mediated agreement could produce
conditions and restrictions to be attached to rezones, special
permits and variances. In contrast to the traditional zoning
process, a mediation effort would create conditions through
joint efforts to find a mutually satisfactory result. In a
mediation conditions are arrived at through compromises and
"packaging" of issues and concerns as described in Chapters
Three and Four. The Blacksburg agreement represents this
process. The parties worked together to draft the agreement
which the Town Council ultimately approved as the special
permit with conditions. In that agreement, all the parties
mutually devised conditions, such as the five year moratorium
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on new development.
The nature of conditional approvals as an enforcement
mechanism and the implication for mediated agreements is the
subject of this section. The purpose of such a discussion is
to demonstrate how aspects of a mediated agreement can be
legally binding on a landowner. It is important to note,
though, that I do not address all the other ways in which the
parties may bind themselves to an agreement. Instead, I
suggest some standards and restrictions that should be
considered when fashioning a mediated agreement.
The use of "conditions" is different for rezones than for
special permits and variances. I will start with a discussion
of special permits and variances, and then address rezones.
1. Special Permits and Variances
Conditions are frequently attached to special permits and
variances. In fact, the Massachus'etts General Laws on Zoning
specifically states that special permits may "impose
conditions, safeguards and limitations on time or use."(1)
And variances may "impose conditions, safeguards and
limitations both of time and of use, including the continued
existence of any particular structures but excluding any
conditions, safeguards or limitations based upon the continued
ownership of the land or structures to which the variance
pertains by the applicant, petitioner or any owner."(2)
Courts have issued opinions supporting the right of
municipalities to attach conditions to variances and special
permits in order to mitigate the impact of a project on a
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community. A Maryland court described a board's power to
limit exceptions such as variances so as "to mitigate the
effect upon neighboring property and the community at
large."(3) But the conditions must be reasonably related to
protections of public health, safety and welfare and may not
contravene the purpose of the zoning ordinance.(4)
The authority to impose conditions is not unrestricted;
certain categories of conditions are invalid under
Massachusetts Law. The Massachusetts Zoning Law states that
any condition placed on a variance relating to ownership will
be invalidated.(5) That is, a variance could not be granted
based on continued ownership of property by a particular
person. Additionally, a variance may not be granted with
conditions that exempt an owner from real estate taxes.(6)
But the law is silent about such restrictions on special
permits.(7) Conditions with "undefined standards" will be
invalidated.(8) In other words, conditions must be explicit
on the face of the permit although further approval of certain
details may be required. For example, a condition that a
water situation "must be arranged to the satisfaction of all
concerned"(9) was invalidated. But a condition requiring
plans and signs be approved by the Planning Board and Board of
Appeals was upheld.(10)
Conditions attached to a special permit or variance may
cover broad areas and issues. There are some guidelines that
should be kept in mind to create a legally defensible
condition. Some gener.al standards applied by the courts to
determine the validity of a condition are whether: 1) it
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offends provisions of the zoning ordinance, 2) it requires
illegal actions, 3) it is in the public interest, 4) it is
reasonably calculated to achieve some legitimate objective of
the zoning ordinance, 5) it is unnecessarily burdensome on the
landowner, and 6) it is clearly defined for the landowner.(ll)
Often a municipal zoning ordinance contains within it specific
requirements for conditions on special permits or variances
that must be followed.(12)
A mediated negotiation could produce conditions such as
the ones approved in a traditional zoning procedure. That is,
once the parties produce the agreement, it could become part
of the approved permit. It may be important for the
negotiating parties to keep in mind the standards listed
above. If the.parties agree to a condition that fails to meet
these standards and the permit is approved, and then
challenged by a disgruntled party (perhaps an unidentified
party in interest), a court may invalidate the permit based on
the impermissible conditions. The ideal circumstances would
be generation of a permit that would be mutually agreed upon,
thus minimizing chances of appeals.
2. Rezones
Rezones with conditions create different problems from
special permits and variances. Not all jurisdictions
acknowledge a practice of placing restrictions on a zoning
amendment. Massachusetts allows a limited form of
"conditions" - for example, in the Arlington case the
amendment restricted the types of structures within the
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approved new zone to townhouses and garden apartments.
Local governments retain the authority to alter zoning
ordinances through legislative actions.(13) That is, a zoning
ordinance may be amended by a city coucil vote as a reflection
of changed conditions in a community.(14) However, rezones of
small parcels may involve particular parties, limited facts,
and bear little relationship to policy considerations for
large parcel rezones.(15) Indeed, a zoning ordinance may be
amended in response to a specific development proposal - the
Arlington case demonstrates this type of a rezone. Generally,
the rezone states the changes granted from one type of use to
another. For example, the Arlington rezone approved a rezone
from a single family neighborhood to a higher density - an
apartment district. In some cases, a city council may approve
restrictions on the specific types of structures allowed on
the property. The Arlington rezone specified only townhouses
or garden apartments, and no duplexes, or two and three family
dwellings. However, restrictions relating to specific details
of a project, such as requirements for open space, may not be
legally attached to a rezone in many jurisdictions.
In recent years some courts have acknowledged a practice
by municipalities called "contract rezoning." Contract
rezoning is a process by which a local government enters into
a private agreement with a developer either by covenant, deed
restriction, or contract.(16) As a result of these
"contracts" a government exacts a promise from the developer
in exchange for its agreement to grant a rezoning.
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Not all courts have accepted this practice. These
agreements have been challenged as illegal "spot zoning."(17)
Courts have held these zoning amendments violate the
legislative mandate of uniform zoning conditions throughout a
district.(18) Additionally, conditions attached to rezones
have been challenged on the basis of allowing local
governments to "bargain away their police power."(19) In the
1971 case of Allred v. City of Raleigh, the court invalidated
a rezone restricting property to specific regulations on the
ground that a municipality is engaged in legislating, not
contracting."(20) The conditioned rezone was invalidated.
In contrast, some state courts, for example, New York and
California, have explicitly embraced the notion of "contract
rezones."(21) Justifying the practice, the California Court
held that "the power to impose conditions on rezoning furthers
the well-being of landowners generally, promotes community
development and serves the general welfare."(22) In that
case, conditions attached to the rezone required the property
owner to install street improvements around the project as a
condition of rezoning.(23) In Maine, a statue permits a
municipality to include in its comprehensive plan provisions
for conditional and contract rezoning.(24)
Although Massachusetts does not specifically acknowledge
the practice, the courts have recognized the right to impose
special conditons through private convenants.(25) In the case
of Sylvania v. City of Newton,(26) the Board of Aldermen
approved a zoning amendment where conditions were set forth in
a private deed attached to a proposed option agreement that
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gave the City the option to purchase the property from the
owner. According to the option agreement, the owner would
abide by the conditions pending purchase by the City. When
the landowner challenged the agreement, the court recognized
the restrictions as a private agreement between the parties
and not in conflict with the laws for rezoning. The Court
held "it does not infringe on zoning principles that, in
connection with a zoning amendment, land use is regulated
other than by the amendment."(27) In addition, the court
acknowledged that it was a proper activity of the local
officials to participate in the negotiations of the private
agreement.(28)
A mediated negotiation of a rezone could produce an
agreement like. a contract rezone that would restrict use of
the land in certain ways. For example, had the parties in
Arlington engaged in mediation, it is possible they would have
agreed that the land be restricted to certain types of
development with a certain amount of land dedicated to public
open space for recreational purposes. This agreement,
(similar to what the Redevelopment Board issued in their
recommendation), then could have become the proposed zoning
amendment. It would look similar to a contract rezone in that
the parties create a "contract" with one another. The
difference between the mediated contract and a traditional
"contract rezone" lies in the process of generating the
agreement. In the traditional process the developer, local
government official and co m0tay engag in ad hoc
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negotiations attempting to reach an agreement. Mediation
provides a structured environment in which a mediator assists
the parties to identify all important parties, issues and
concerns and find mutually satisfactory ways to resolve
conflicts.
In the state of Massachusetts mediated agreements of
rezones would be somewhat restricted, because the courts do
not acknowledge the practice of contract rezone. A rezone
petition from a mediated agreement can only specify the types
of buildings or relate only to that which is allowed under the
local zoning ordinance. Requirements that land be left open
may not be included in the amendment; it may be necessary to
effectuate these agreements through private covenants between
the parties. For example, in the Sylvania case, the private
agreement included restrictions on the limit of the foor area
for the building, setbacks of certain amounts, open space of a
sepcified size, a buffer zone, restricted numbers and types of
signs, limited types of uses for buildings, and establiment of
a traffic pattern.(29) A negotiated agreeement may have many
of these elements. As in the Sylvania case, the zoning
regulations must be separated from the restrictions when
submitted to the council for approval.
In those states acknowledging the practice of "contract
rezoning," mediated agreements may be more specifically tied
to the zoning amendment. That is, the agreement itself may be
voted on by the legislative body considering the amendment.
The standard used by courts to review contract rezones when
challenged by one party or another, is to determine whether
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the conditions are intended to prevent adverse impacts on the
community.(30) In addition, courts look at the reasonableness
of the rezone itself, the effect on the adjacent properties,
the benefit to the public welfare and the reasonableness of
the conditions.(32) Those conditions meeting these standards
have been upheld in the past. For example, in the New York
case of Collard v. Village of Flower Hill,(32) the court
upheld a rezone with conditions that all construction on the
site would be subject to approval by a board of trustees. The
court found these conditions reasonably related to the public
interest and could be considered to be within the "spirit" of
enabling legislation.(33)
In conclusion, it is already an established fact that
governments use conditions on rezones, special permits and
variances to enforce particular use of land. Massachusetts
courts acknowledge this practice for variances and special
permits, but allow only limited qualifications on rezones
while acknowledging the practice of engaging in private
"contracts." When developing agreements, parties attempting
to negotiate a zoning conflict may wish to consider some of
these standards and restrictions suggested in this chapter to
determine what a court might consider valid. It is also
important to explore what other mechanisms may exist for
enforcement that are not addressed in this paper.
B. GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION IN NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS
The second section of this chapter examines some of the
restrictions placed on participation of local government
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official in mediated negotiations of zoning disputes. As
suggested in earlier chapters, a mediated land use dispute
should include the developer, the representatives of
neighborhood interests and representatives from the local
government.(34) Problems may arise though when local
government officials engage in the negotiation process.
This section looks at issues affecting three different
levels of government officials who would be potential
participants in a negotiation: planning staff, members of the
Planning Board (this also includes other municipal boards and
commissions), and members of the Zoning Board of Appeals or
City Council (i.e. the decision-making body). I address two
issues which may affect their participation; 1) sunshine, or
open meeting laws, and 2) ex parte contacts. I address only
these two issues although there are many others that should be
considered. One major issue that should be noted but is not
addressed in this paper is whether a mediated negotiation
could replace a public hearing and satisfy due process
requirements. I have based by discussions of mediation on a
model in which the final negotiated agreement would be
submitted to the permit granting authority or decision-making
body who would hold a public hearing and issue a determination
on the proposal. Different legal issues arise from the two
different models. However, my discussion is limited to issues
applicable to the second model as set forth in this paper.
1. Sunshine Laws
A negotiation session may be affected by the
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Massachusetts Open Meeting Law, sometimes referred to as the
"sunshine" law.(35) The law states, "all meetings of a
governmental body shall be open to the public and any person
shall be permitted to attend any meeting except as otherwise
provided by this section."(36) The term "meeting" is defined
in the section as "any corporal convening and deliberation of
a governmental body for which a quorum is required in order to
make a decision at which any public business or public policy
matter over which the governmental body has supervision,
control, jurisdiction or advisory power is discussed or
considered."(37) A governmental body includes every board,
commission, committee or subcommittee of any district, city,
region or town, however elected, appointed or otherwise
constituted.(32)
The issue.of whether the Open Meeting law applies to
mediated negotiation is important because of the nature of the
interactions during the sessions. Often times the key to a
mediation session is the ability of the parties to develop a
trust in one another in order to make suggestions or
compromises without fear it would not be held against them.
Open meetings, attended by press or parties who may not have a
direct interest in the conflict (as identified by the
mediator) may have two competing effects on negotiations. On
the one hand, the presence of outsiders may stifle the
willingness of participants to offer potentially valuable
information and take risks. Therefore, if the Open Meeting
Law applied to mediated negotiations, parties might be
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hesitant to participate. On the other hand, open sessions
and the increased public exposure may ensure the parties
continue to act in good faith throughout the process. Thus,
"closed sessions" may not always be appropriate for mediation
sessions.
In a 1981 case, the Massachusetts Appeals Court
specifically applied the Open Meeting Law to'zoning boards.
The Massachusetts court invalidated a special permit to build
residential condominiums in Yaro v. Board of Appeals of
Newburyport(39) because the zoning board made a determination
in a closed session without a record of the meeting.
Participation of a staff member in mediated negotiations
would not trigger requirements for the Open Meeting Law. The
Open Meeting Law does not apply to meetings held by staff
members as defined by statute.(40) In actuality, planning
staff members may have little, if any, legal restrictions on
their participation in a mediated negotiation. As advisors or
technical assistants to planning boards, staff members
constantly enter into discussions with developers and generate
proposals for conditions to be presented to the decision-
making body.(41)
The Open Meeting law does not specifically address the
issue of negotiation sessions involving members of zoning
boards, planning boards or city councils. Yet the law may be
inv.oked where a majority of a board or council participates in
a negotiation.(42) When a majority of the board or council
members are present it may be mandatory to issue notice of the
meeting, and allow the public to attend the sessions. If the
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results of the negotiating group submitts its agreement to a
decision-making body for final approval, then the meetings at
which the conditions are negotiated are only interim steps and
not final decisions and thus may not be subject to Open
Meeting Laws. In addition, a session attended by only one
member of the board would not constitute a quorum of the
governmental body and the requirement for open meetings would
not apply. If negotiation sessions are construed as the final
decison-making process, the courts may require the sessions be
open to the public with proper notice even though a minority
of the planning board participates. Thus, it is how a
negotiation session is characterized in the decision-making
process by the courts that may determine whether to apply the
Open Meeting Law - and not the authority of the participants.
2. Ex Parte Contact
Agreements resulting from mediated negotiations involving
members of a board of appeals or city council could be
challenged on the basis of ex parte contacts. A challenge of
"ex parte" contact may be made when communications between a
decision-making body and the petition applicants or other
potential parties in a negotiation have not been presented for
response to all who are parties to the decision. Unfairness
arises when the views of one party come before the board under
circumstances which deprive the opposing party of the
opportunity to know what was presented and to respond to
it.(43)
Zoning boards should be the "impartial judges" of a
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zoning decision; participation by a board member in the
formulation of conditions for a special permit or variance may
therefore lead to challenges of ex parte contacts.
problems.(44) Members of a city council are not held to as
strict a standard, because, noted in Chapter One, decisions by
city councils on zoning amendments are considered legislative
rather than adjudicative, and thus standards of due process
are not as strict as for zoning board procedures. But in
recent years, the trend towards consideration of rezones as a
quasi-judicial decison has increased the need for greater due
process standards.(45) This higher standard may lead to
challenges of unfairness as a result of participation by
council members in mediation sessions.
In tradit.ional zoning cases, courts may invalidate
decisions of boards or councils where it finds that
individuals in a decision-making capacity obtained information
or contacts which have not been made available to all parties
to respond. Yet an Oregon court acknowledged that placing
information on the official record could satisfy the
"impartiality" requirements. On a request for a variance in
Peterson v. Lake Oswego,(46) the city council discussed a
petition with members of the planning commission and the
applicant library board. Although the variance was denied,
the court held that "if ex parte communication does take
place, it must be placed on the public record to enable
interested persons to rebut the substance of the
communication." (47)
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A recent case exemplifies the need to allow all parties
an opportunity to rebut the substance of ex parte contacts. A
Maine court vacated a denial of a subdivision application by
the town planning board where the board invited opponents of
the proposal to assist in preparation of findings of facts
necessary to support the board's denial.(48) No other
parties, including the developer or any proponents, received
notice of the meeting. The Supreme Court held that the fact-
finding process itself may conclusively determine one's
property rights, and that ex parte participation in that
process clearly violated the developer's constitutional
rights.(49)
If the standards of Peterson v. Lake Oswego(50) apply,
the court may have upheld the decision in the Maine case had
all parties received an opportunity to comment on the
proposal. Thus, presentation of a negotiated agreement at a
public hearing prior to a final decision may satisfy
requirements for full disclosure of the ex parte contact.
In a negotiation session, challenges of ex parte contacts
by a dissatisfied party can potentially invalidate a proposal.
To guard against such a contention, all sessions of the
negotiations should be entered onto the public record to allow
all parties equal access to the information. Courts would
then decide whether all parties received a full and fair
opportunity to challenge the information from the negotiation
session.
Ex parte as an issue could be eliminated if a mediation
is properly structured so that parties in the negotiations
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include all those with an interest in the decision, allowing
each the opportunity to respond to any and all agreements. In
fact, this is the central notion of mediation; parties respond
directly to one another throughout the process to address
issues in conflict. If all parties are present throughtout
the sessions, the issue of ex parte should not arise at a
later stage, i.e. at a zoning board or city council hearing.
Ideally, by the time of a hearing, all the parties have
examined all the issues.
C. ANALYSIS
Neither of the two legal issues discussed in this chapter
pose serious obstacles to the use of mediated negotiation for
zoning disputes in Massachusetts. Yet it is important for
those using mediated negotiation to be mindful of them. By
paying attention to certain guidelines, participants can
reduce the chances that their actions will lead to serious
legal complications.
With respect to the ability to enforce the agreements,
zoning laws already exist which serve as a framework for
mediated negotiations. Mediated negotiations for special
permits or variances could produce a set of conditions that
could be legally binding on the landowner as set forth by
statute.
Conditions for variances and special permits must comply
with some general standards. Conditions must: 1) conform with
the zoning ordinance, 2) be reasonably related to the public
interest, 3) not be unduly burdensome to the landowner, 4) not
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related to ownership of the property, and 5) be clearly
defined on the face of the permit. Where local zoning
ordinances provide guidelines for conditions, these must also
be considered.
Under existing Massachusetts law, an agreement made
through a mediated negotiation of a rezone cannot be submitted
to a city council or other decision-making body for approval.
Only the specific request for a change of zoning could be
submitted as a zoning ordinance. Meanwhile, the parties can
agree to certain restrictions that would be binding through
the use of private covenants.
Mediation sessions may be subject to the Massachusetts
Open Meeting Laws under certain circumstances and depending on
certain interpretations of the law. At present it is unclear
how the law would apply to negotiations. If a court
determines that "meetings" include sessions where- only one or
two members of the board or council are present, or that
negotiations are considered convening of government bodies,
then the Open Meeting Law would apply.
The final legal issue, ex parte contacts, may pose a
problem for both council and zoning board member participation
in mediation sessions. Ex parte problems may be minimized by
making a public record of the sessions. In addition, if a
mediation session includes all interested parties, and those
who might potentially challenge the agreement are present
throughout the process, there might be no violation of due
process rights.
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CHAPTER SIX
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGE
This chapter explores one aspect of institutionalizing
mediation in the zoning process. This discussion is offered
more to give a flavor of the politics of institutionalization
rather than a scholarly analysis of the ways in which to
promote widespread use of mediation.
There are many different ways in which mediation could
become a regular part of the zoning process. As a few
examples, local governments could choose to adopt such
procedures on a voluntary basis, zoning laws could be altered
through legal challenges to mediation efforts, or states could
adopt enabling legislation. The use of legislative means, or
state action, to legitimize the process is discussed in this
chapter. A statewide ordinance acknowledging the practice of
mediation is one possible channel for institutionalizing
mediation.
In this chapter I describe a proposed mediation ordinance
and then examine the political actors who supported and
opposed the legislation. The discussion explores the views of
developers, zoning administrators, local officials,
environmentalists and members of the League of Women Voters,
all of whom took an active interest in the concept. Their
ideas and opinions may help those who are interested in
promoting the concept of mediation to recognize potential
political barriers to implementation.
In the past three years, efforts have been made in two
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states to incorporate a mediation option into comprehensive
bills to revise their state zoning acts. In these two states,
Rhode Island and Pennsylvania, legislation was introduced
which awaits initial committee review. As the issue is
complicated, misunderstood, and not a high priority for many
legislators, the legislation has not progressed far in either
state.
Pennsylvania instigated the first mediation effort.
Aware of the ongoing attempts to refashion the state zoning
legislation, staff from the Brandywine Conservancy
Environmental Management Center, a Pennsylvania organization
providing environmental assistance in land use planning and
management to four counties surrounding Philadelphia, drafted
the language for mediation legislation.(1) Familiarity with
the use of mediation to resolve environmental disputes led the
authors to believe site - specific land use disputes could
also be resolved with the same technique. As the two major
authors of the legislation noted, "there is general agreement
that the mediation process is more 'manageable' and has a
greater chance of success if the dispute and the parties are
easily defined and limited in scope. Considering these
factors together, it appears local land use disputes would be
logical candidates for mediation."(2) Parties in Rhode Island
involved in updating their zoning enabling act took the same
language proposed in Pennsylvania and lobbied for its
inclusion in their new zoning act.
A. LANGUAGE OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION
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The proposed legislation defines mediation as a voluntary
negotiating process "in which parties in a dispute mutally
select a neutral mediator to assist them in jointly exploring
and settling their differences, culminating in a written
agreement which the parties themselves create and consider
acceptable."(3) The ordinance designates mediation as
appropriate for special exceptions, variances, zoning
amendments, and subdivision appeals. It must be voluntary and
should not replace any existing procedures. It may not be
initiated or participated in by either the planning board or
zoning board of appeals. The option should not be interpreted
as an expansion or limitation of any municipal police power or
modification of any principle of substantive law. Also,
protection for participants from future litigation is
established under a clause stating that offers or statements
made in the mediation sessions, excluding the final written
mediated agreement, are not admissible as evidence in any
subsequent judicial or administrative proceedings.(4)
The bill lists seven fundamental issues to be addressed
by all the mediating parties. These terms and conditions are:
1. Funding mediation;
2. Selecting a mediator who, at a minimum, shall have a
working knowledge of municipal zoning and subdivision
procedures and demonstrated skills in mediation;
3. Completing mediation, including time limits for such
completion;
4. Suspending time limits otherwise authorized in this
Act, provided there is written consent by the mediating
parties, and by an applicant or municipal decision - making
body if either is not a party to the mediation;
5. Identifying any additional important parties and
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affording them the opportunity to participate;
6. Subject to legal restraints, determining whether some
or all of the mediation sesssions shall be open or closed to
the public; and
7. Assuring that mediated solutions are in writing and
signed by the parties, and become subject to review and
approval by the appropriate decision - making body pursuant to
the authorized procedures set forth in the other sections of
this Act.(5)
The language of the bill presents municipalities with a
voluntary system to be used to resolve frustrating and time
consuming land use disputes. The option does not try to
replace any existing standards nor change the law. Rather,
municipalities are granted an option to fashion a negotiation
appropriate to each new situation.
B. OPINIONS OF PROPONENTS AND OPPONENTS
A draft of the proposed legislation circulated throughout
the community in Rhode Island and generated a wide- variety of
responses. Respondents included a staff member from Rhode
Island League of Town and Cities, (the major promoter of the
concept), builders, realtors, the State Association of Zoning
Boards of Appeals, planners, lawyers, developers, and
environmentalists.(6) These parties formed four major
interest groups concerned with rewriting the existing zoning
enabling act; 1) the development community, 2) local
government officials, 3) environmentalists, and 4) "good
government" concerns. Their reactions may well reflect
general attitudes towards mediation and barriers to enactment
of such a legislative amendment.
The Building Association, representing builders,
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developers, and general contractors, did not favor the
mediation option.(7) This development community voiced two
major concerns. First, the concept has not been clearly
defined and demonstrated to prove its purpose. In the
abstract, mediation appears as one more way for local
governments or citizen groups to stall development projects.
They resented the many existing layers of hearings and
bureaucratic red tape which added great expenses for delays to
the project cost. Any legislation increasing the number of
hearings or adding additional delays would be opposed by this
coalition. Therefore, chances are slim for gathering support
of a proposal that appears to slow down what is already
considered an administrative nightmare for developers.
A.second.concern with mediation for the development
community revolves around identification of participating
parties. Although case law provides some guidelines, it is
difficult to predict and identify parties with "legitimate"
interests in a dispute. Developers fear a negotiation process
as described in the proposed legislation would broaden the
scope of developer responsibility with the effect of
increasing rather than decreasing the amount of conflicts.
Vocal opposition to the mediation proposal came from the
Zoning Board Association.(8) As the final authority for
variances and special permits, zoning boards play a
significant role in directing the course of development in a
community. The zoning boards may encourage development and
may do so in opposition to community development schemes
proposed by local planning staff and elected officials.
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Proposals for legislation that would limit this local
decision-making authority are rebuffed by the Zoning Board
Association. This group perceived mediation to be a
detraction from their present authority to judge zoning
disputes. They felt developers currently engaged in
"negotiations" and no formalized process should be necessary.
If a developer failed to "do his homework" by way of
responding to municipal and community concerns, then the
petition should be denied by the board.
City and Town councils generally favored revisions to the
zoning statute.(9) Some local officials perceive zoning as a
major tool for promotion of economic development for their
communities while others use zoning for growth control. Where
officials wish. to promote changes for their community, they
object to their lack of control over the current zoning
process. Final decisions by zoning boards for variances or
special permits may conflict with development goals of local
officials. In response to this conflict between local
authorities, Rhode Island courts now hear a growing number of
cases filed by local town or city councils challenging
decisions of local zoning boards. Local officials would
support the concept of mediation if it provided an opportunity
for their interests to be addressed in the decision-making
process.
T-he League of Women voters, representing a "good
government" position, are major supporters of zoning revisions
and the mediation option.(10) The League recognizes a need to
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change the current zoning act. The overwhelming discretion of
zoning boards is one of their major concerns. League members
believe locally appointed boards abuse their power in making
zoning decisions. That is, they believe decisions should be
based on a comprehensive plan or in accordance with an overall
legislative scheme. They feel zoning boards all too often
bypass these plans to approve projects. The League advocates
for a state appeal system of local zoning decisions to provide
greater consistency in decisions throughout the state. They
also promote greater citizen participation. For the League,
the mediation option could improve citizen participation while
addressing the issue of zoning board abuse of discretion.
Environmental groups favor any revisions to the zoning
ordinance with the effect of improving their access to the
system.(ll) Many.groups feel the current process restricts
their ability to use zoning to protect the environment.
Mediated negotiation has become an important tool to the
environmental community in other types of disputes - siting a
power plant or retaining open space for a park are two
examples.(12) The technique has allowed these groups greater
access to the decision-making process. Applied to zoning,
mediation could improve the limitations of current citizen
participation at public hearings. The traditional process may
provide the opportunity to be heard, but does not guarantee
community interests will be addressed. Nevertheless,
environmentalists retain a healthy skepticism for any process,
including mediation, that could potentially perpetuate their
current exclusion from discussions or lead to their co-
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optation.
C. OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION
One of the major obstacles to passing legislation seems
to be the lack of familiarity with the concept. Most people
hear the term "negotiation" and think of the traditional
positional bargaining techniques. Experiments to use mediated
negotiation have not received sufficient attention to
publicize the technique. Unfamiliarity with the idea of a
third party intervenor is compounded by a lack of confidence
in the concept of "consensus building" or collaborative
problem solving which plays an important role in mediated
negotiations.
In order to promote the concept to different groups,
there is a need for specific examples. To overcome the
skepticism of local officials, developers, citizen groups and
other interested parties, sponsors of the concept must be able
to turn to successful cases of mediated zoning disputes, such
as the Blacksburg case, to illustrate the technique. Without
test cases to prove the effectiveness of the concept,
promoters have no product to sell.
A second major obstacle to legislative enactment is the
nature of the power balance in zoning decisions. Legislation
delegates the authority for decision-making for a special
permit and variance to the zoning boards or other locally
appointed lay boards. Although the boards are appointed by
mayors or town officials, the elected officials retain no
control over board decisions. As long as zoning boards retain
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an unrestricted authority, they will be hesitant to approve of
any system diminishing that power.
According to proponents of the Rhode Island legislation,
the building community seems to form a strong coalition-with
some zoning boards against any process that restricts
development. This coalition represents economic development
which, in the present political climate, receives strong
support from state legislators. Mediation is perceived as a
stumbling block to development, another layer of governmental
red tape and is therefore an unpopular concept.
On the other side of the power balance lies community
groups who lack the political clout of developers. Community
groups may perceive legal redress as an effective tool to
thwart development. Feeling as though they can adequately
address their concerns in this manner, these groups may be
reluctant to support a reorganization of the power structure
and implementation of a new decision-making process where they
can no longer identify the "enemy" or they become part of the
process.
To gather support for legislation, a new coalition must
be built. If zoning boards are abusing their discretionary
power, this should be challenged. Local governments, citizen
groups, and even developers should demand a new alliance of
power to ensure fairness and consistency of decisions. A new
coalition could attempt to shift the importance away from
quantity of development to quality of process and therefore
quality of development throughout the state. Such a strategy
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could at the same time promote economic development and
improvement of the existing procedures. Mediation should be
presented to all parties as the vehicle for increasing the
efficiency of the system and a cost saving device for
developers with controversial projects. Thus, by addressing
the major concerns of political alliances affecting
legislative decisions, the prospects could be realized for
enactment of a mediation option.
Party politics are a third major obstacle to legislative
enactment of a mediation option. Pennsylvania supporters and
sponsors of the zoning bill find their Democratic coalition
receives little attention in a Republican chaired Senate
Committee. Planning and zoning issues are traditionally
categorized as "Democratic" issues. In a strong partisan
envirionment, new zoning legislation, and mediation in
particular, may receive little attention unless the issue may
be construed as "Republican." This problem could be addressed
in the same manner as realignment of the power structure.
Promotion of zoning, and mediation as a part of that process,
as a means for developers to pursue their development rather
than as a governmental system to delay projects could elicit
greater support from Republican and pro-development
legislators.
This chapter identifies political barriers that may be
encountered by legislative efforts to promote mediation in the
zoning process. The major roadblocks, based on the
experiences in Rhode Jsland, appear to be the politics of
local government decision-making bodies and the strength of
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the development community to effectively control legislation
impacting their interests. Promoters of the concept may want
to address such issues as how local governments might need to
change the weight given to appointed administrative bodies and
issues of power that could arise from such efforts. Likewise,
the development community may need convincing that the process
will enhance their ability to engage in their occupations in
order to gain their support for mediation legislation.
Mediation as a concept and the language of the proposed
legislation is a long way from satisfying these two critical
interest groups. Nevertheless, acknowledging the existence of
these barriers is the first step towards overcoming them.
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CONCLUSION
In this paper I have explored the idea of mediation as a
way to address deficiencies in the zoning administrative
process. Current administrative procedures sometimes fail to
ensure fairness and efficiency in the decision-making process.
I have examined specific aspects of the zoning process that
tend to increase the likelihood of conflicts. I then propose
mediated negotiation as a technique to overcome deficiencies
in the current zoning system.
Zoning decisions are prone to controversy. No matter
what may be the final decision, someone will be affected by
the results. And where these affected parties feel excluded
from the decision-making process conflicts will often arise.
The zoning process encourages the parties to interact
with one another to.try to resolve differences (as
demonstrated by the Arlington case study in Chapter Two).
Public meetings or public hearings can be used to serve the
function of airing differences. Sometimes the developer takes
the initiative to contact parties concerned about a project to
work through conflicts, a tactic used by the Arlington
developer. Other times the developer negotiates-directly with
the local government, promising certain actions in exchange
for the granting of a permit.
Some aspects of the administrative process, whether it be
for a request for rezoning, special permit or variance,
exacerbate conflicts among the parties with an interest in the
outcome of a decision. In this paper I have identified five
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weaknesses of these interactions that can cause conflicts; 1)
a lack of direct communication between all the parties, 2) the
adversary nature of interactions, 3) the lack of
representation of all interested parties, 4) the inability of
parties to search for mutually satisfactory solutions to their
differences, and 5) the difficulties of addressing the full
range of disputed issues.
The structure of the current zoning administrative
process provides few, if any, opportunities to address these
weaknesses. I suggest that mediated negotiations could
address each of these deficiencies. The model for such an
approach retains elements of the traditional zoning process
but adopts other innovations. In this model, when the local
government receives applications for zoning changes, either
petitions for rezones, or requests for special permits and
variances, a determination is made about the nature of the
conflict. A staff member may suggest mediation to a developer
where concerns can be identified. Alternatively, a developer
or community group may propose mediation where they see an
opportunity for the parties to resolve their differences. The
process would be entirely voluntary and agreed upon by all the
parties. Also, a mediator would be chosen by the parties.
The parties would engage in a series of mediation
sessions in which the mediator assists the parties in
identifying their concerns and interests. Then the group
would try to resolve conflicts by "packaging" a new proposal.
If an agreement is reached, the results would be submitted to
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the decision-making body with the authority to issue
determinations on that type of a request. A public hearing
hearing would be held and a decision would be rendered. The
final zoning decision would incorporate the mediated
agreement.
This model for the zoning process responds directly to
problems inherent in the traditional zoning procedure. The
mediated negotiation creates a neutral environment in which
parties in a conflict may search for a mutually satisfactory
resolution to a conflict. Important aspects of the mediation
process include the ability to 1) include all parties in
interest in the problem solving process, 2) share information
between the parties in efforts to "package" concerns, 3)
provide a framework in which the parties can discuss these
issues, 4) provide a mechanism to ensure representation for
all interests and concerns in the outcome of the decision, and
finally 5) encourage the parties to communicate directly with
one another so as to develop relationships for future
interactions.
The traditional zoning process provides a legal framework
for enforcement of some types of mediated zoning agreements.
In Massachusetts, the Zoning Act acknowledges the practice of
granting permits with conditions for both variances and
special permits. Local zoning ordinances may even provide
specific guidelines for these restrictions. Restrictions
could be generated as a result of a mediated negotiation and
then submitted to the permit granting authority as the
conditions to be attached to the special permit or variance.
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Under current Massachusetts law, conditions for rezoning
resulting from a mediated negotiation could not be submitted
for approval by the decision-making body (although permissible
in other states). Instead, the agreement for specific
restrictions might be enforced through private agreements.
Massachusetts courts would not invalidate a zoning amendment
granted in conjunction with such private covenants, deeds or
other private contracts.
The Massachusetts Open Meeting Law may affect the nature
of a mediation session. The courts have not specifically
addressed this issue regarding negotiations. When a local
government official participates in the negotiations, the Open
Meeting Law may require the public be informed and invited to
the sessions. The law might also be interpreted to apply only
for, meetings officiated by a majority of a governing body.
Where only one member of that body is a participant in
meetings, and the purpose of the session is to develop an
agreement among all the parties, the Open Meeting Law may not
apply.
Problems may arise from participation in mediation
sessions by members of a zoning board of appeals, city
council, or a member of any final decision-making authority.
Their participation may lead to challenges of ex parte
contacts, a basis for a court to invalidate a proposal. One
way to avoid such a problem would be to restrict government
participation to members of the planning staff or planning
board. However, members of zoning boards or city and town
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councils may be important parties in the mediation sessions.
Certain precautions could minimize the risk of ex parte
challenges. First, the parties and the mediator must ensure
all parties or interests in the zoning decision are
represented in the mediation sessions. All participants must
have full and fair opportunities to challenge any information
reported at the sessions. Second, accurate minutes from the
sessions should be entered onto the public record at the
public hearing of the decision-making body.
Politcal questions arise when considering the possibility
of using mediation on a regular basis. Critics believe
mediation could disturb the power balance of public bodies and
private interests. Some actors might be unwilling to yield to
a system that they perceive would diminish their power or
their ability to influence the decision-making process. The
lack of familia-rity with the concept of mediation heightens
the suspicions of these individuals.
Mediation would improve access to the decision-making
process where parties are directly involved in devising an
agreement. Participants would help tailor the outcome to some
their interests while seeking compromises on others. In the
model proposed in this paper, the decision-makers would not
lose their authority to render a final decision. In fact,
their authority might remain unchanged. Final decisions of a
zoning board of appeals upon a negotiated agreement may be
less likely to be challenged where the decision is created and
supported by all the interested parties.
Cost, both in terms of time and money, may dampen wide
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spread use of mediation in the zoning process. Often there is
little, if any, extra funding to pay for mediation services.
Even where costs are cut by use of mediators who are staff
members of the local government, parties may not be willing to
invest extra time to attend the sessions. They may
religiously attend public meetings and hearings regarding a
project of interest. However, they may be unwilling to commit
their time to a voluntary process which does not guarantee a
favorable outcome. Over time, wider useage and greater
acceptance of the process may lead to more creative solutions
to funding problems and more willingness to participate. For
instance, if local governments wish to promote use of the
technique, they may become more willing to train staff members
as mediators. Parties who recognize the potential for
improving the decision-making process by their participation
in a mediation effort may be more willing to spend time and
money on negotiation sessions.
As local governments, developers and community groups
become more frustrated by current land use practices, they may
be more willing to explore process alternatives such as
mediated negotiation. Experimentation with the technique will
generate greater understanding of how to improve the process.
Likewise, there is a great need to explore -how to overcome
some of the legal, political and economic barriers to the use
of mediation in the zoning process. Further research could
demonstrate the importance of this process as a way to address
deficiencies in the current zoning administrative process.
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ATTACHMENT "A"
INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL NEGOTIATION
CAMPBELL HALL, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, CHARLOTTESVILLE 22903
TELEPHONE (801) 924-1970
William Issel
Division of Planning
Town of Blacksburg
300 South Main Street
Blacksburg, VA
George Lester
Lester Development Corporation
P.O. Box 4784
Martinsville, VA 24112
Richard Stock
Haymarket Square Homeowners' Association
2828 Wellesley Court
Blacksburg, VA
Dear Sirs:
As a follow-up to our discussions with each of you (or your
representative) on February 9th, we are using this common
letter to describe the conditions which we think are requisites
to useful negotiations over the proposed additional develop-
ment of the commercial center of the Hethwood P.D.R. in
Blacksburg, Virginia.
We believe successful negotiations can be undertaken if the
following conditions are acceptable to each party.
The Haymarket Square Homeowners' Association will:
1 - agree to negotiate within a limited time frame, i.e.
by April 1, 1983,
2 - appoint two or three negotiators who are representative
of the Haymarket Square Homeowners' Association as a
whole,
3 - make a good faith effort to negotiate its needs for the
commercial center, but also agkowledge the developer's
needs for the commercial center and to seek joint gains.
4 - testify before the Town of Blacksburg in support of a
development alternative if agreed to by April 1, 1983.
The Town of Blacksburg will:
1 - allow the substitution of an alternative development
plan up until April 1, 1983, without requiring the
developer to repeat stages in the Town's approval
process which the developer's pending application has
already passed.
letter to William Issel, George Lester, & Richard Stock
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The Lester Development Corporation will:
1 - participate in at least four joint meetings with
representatives of Haymarket Square Homeowners'
Association, and the Town of Blacksburg's Planning
Staff,
2 - make a good faith effort to negotiate its basic needs
for the commercial center, with an open mind as to
how these needs might be met,
3 - consider the future development of all three vacant
parcels in the commercial center and not just the one
for which their application is now pending,
4 - if, through the negotiations, an alternative development
plan has been agreed to by all the parties by April 1,
1983, withdraw the January 18, 1983, proposal for
development of the service station and related facilities
and substitute for the January plan the alternative
plan.
We are, by separate communication, inviting the Hethwood
Foundation to participate in the negotiations if they find
the following conditions acceptable. They will:
1 - negotiate within the limited time frame, i.e. by April
1, 1983,
2 - appoint representatives to negotiate on behalf of the
Hethwood Foundation as a whole,
3 - make a good faith effort to meet the needs of the
Hethwood Development as a whole, while recognizing
also the needs of the developer and the needs of the
Haymarket Square residents,
4 - serve as active participants in the negotiations and
express the full range of concerns they have over the
development of the commercial center.
In view of the limited time period in which the proposed
negotiations would take place, we request that you advise us
by February 16, 1983, as to whether or not the conditions
stated above are agreeable to you. If all parties agree to
the process, we would expect to arrange for a first meeting
during the week of February 21, 1983, -and to be back in touch
with you with specific details.
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We look forward to hearing from you by February 16th.
Sincerely,
A. Bruce Dotson
Acting Director
Douglas M. Frame
Senior Associate
11 February 1983
cc: Hethwood Foundation
DMF: sdp
ATTACHMENT "B"
Negotiation Ground Rules
re
Hethwood Village Shopping Center Development
3/3/83
1. The -focus of the negotiations is to seek agreement on development
of the Hethwood Village Shopping Center which will be both
financially successful and an asset to the neighborhood.
2. The following organizations are recognized as the negotiating
stakeholders and may be represented by up to three negotiators
each:
Lester Development Corporation
Haymarket Square Homeowners Association
e (Hethwood Foundation
ZSnyder-Hunt Corporation
a cr Town of Blacksburg
3. The Institute for Environmental Negotiation will assist the
stakeholders as facilitators and mediators.
4. Recognizing the limited time frame for seeking an agreement
(prior to the scheduled March 28, 1983 meeting of the Blacksburg
Planning Commission panel) all stakeholders have agreed' to nego-
tiate -together in good faith in at least four meetings. (two more
after March 1, 1983).
5. No uninvited guests nor representatives of the press will be
permitted in the negotiations.
6. Negotiators may consult with their constituencies, but will not
discuss the details of the negotiations with outside parties.
Any written communication between stakeholders will be provided
promptly to all other stakeholders and to the mediator.
7. If, at the conclusion of the mediation, all parties agree on a
solution then all parties shall be willing to express their
support and to explain it to others.
8. Place and time for each meeting will be announced at the conclu-
sion of each preceeding meeting.
March 23, 98ATTAcMET "C" (aaeie Ma rch 289, 9'
mr. William Issel Ms. Lelia .avton
Director of Planning Haymarket Scuare Homeowner'
Town of Blacksburg Association
300 South Market Street 2903 Wellington Court
Balck:sburg, Va.. 24060 Blacksburg, Va. 24060
11r. Gary Smith Mr. Richard -Moore
Lester Development Corporation Hethwood Foundation
P.O. Box 4784 100-G Houndchase at Hethwoo.
Martinsville, Va. 24112 Blacksburg, Va. 24060
Dear Friends:
Pursuant to the negotiation process set forth in our letter
to your organizations of February 11, 1983, this letter records
the agreement reached among you on £Narch 22 on the development
of remaining portions of the Hethwood Village Shopping.Center
in Blacksburg, Va.
1- The.negotiators representing Haymarket Square Homeowner's
Association and the Hethwood Foundation agree to speak
in support of this agreement and to explain their
reasons therefore when it is considered by the
Planning Commission and the Town Council of Blacksburg.,
2- The developer agrees to submit the stipulated agree-
ments in this letter as part of the. site plan proposal
currently pending before the Town and to make necessary
applications. to the Town to have the provisions of this
agreement apply to other parcels of the Hethwood
Village Shopping Center.
3- The Town agrees to consider an amendment to it PDR
ordinance to permit commercial uses compatible with the
residential character of the area. Haymarket Square
Homeowner's Association, Hethwood Foundation and the
developer agree to support that ordinance change.
4- For the out parcel whose long axis parallels Hethwood
Boulevard, permitted uses shall include institutional,
financial or office activities,
5- The Town agrees to provide the Haymarket Square Home-
owner's Association with mailed copies of Planning
Commission agendas on a regular basis ,in accordance with
Town practices for agenda .mailings.
Thu lastitute is atiliated with The Division -of Uiban and Environnenal Planning in the
5houtI Uf .Achite(iuIe at thu Unitersity of Virginia, and funded by a grant fron Thc Virginia
Envi on.11,-nenal EsIdUwImaeIACt.
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6- A convenience store, a gas station and a car.wash of
five bays (with the positioning of the .car wash to be
worked out between the developer and the town to
enhance vehicular flow) shall be supported by all
parties to the negotiation.
7- A curb cut in Price's Fork Road at the location shown
in site plan A shall be supported by all parties to
the.negotiation.. The cut shall permit access and exit,
but with left turns prohibited in both cases.
8- -There shall be a prohibition on further curb cuts on
Price's Fork Road -and Hethwood Boulevard.
9- Two zones for hours of business shall exist which shall
be separated by a line running .down the access road
from Hethwood Boulevard and extending through the
existing buildings of the shopping center.
In areas .north of this line, inf the two existing
shops north of this line, and in any future shops
north of this line hours shall be as follows:
Monday through Saturday 6:00 a.m. - Midnight
Sunday 11:00 a.m. - '8:00 p.m.
Sunday Restaurants only 8:00 a.m. - 10:00 p.m.
In areas and shops to- the south of this line:
Monday through Saturday 8:00 a.m. - 10:00 p.m.
Sunday 12:00 Noon - 8:00 p.m.
The car wash and vacuum machines need not be disconnected
during off duty hours. Car wash and vacuum hours shall
be posted as well as no trespassing signs for off duty
hours. Lights (other than security) shall be turned off
during non duty hours.
10- The developer agrees not to seek and the Town agrees
not to approve changes in the hours of business for the
Shopping Center as described. in no.. 9 above for a
period of 5 years from the Town's approval of the
gas station/conveneince store/car wash development.
:1 L LA.
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11- Lighting for the Convenience store, gas station and
car .-.ash shall be installed so as to sh'ine down.-ard
and not toward the South. Lights over the vacuum
pu:ps shall be at a maximum of 8 feet frcm ground
level.
12- A berm and screeiilng shall be installed on the
Southern boundary of the gas station/convenience store/
car wash parcel of such height as to screen car head-
lights
We request each of you to go over this letter and to
relay any comments to us as soon as possible.
As agreed at Tuesday's negotiationsessior, we will all
meet together in the Municipal Building at 4:00 p.m. Ionday
M1arch 28 to -deal with any necessary revisions and clarifications
in advance of the 5:00 p.m. Planning Commission Co::-ittee meeting.
Sincerelyi,
A. Bruce Dotson
Assistant Director
Douglas M. Frame
Senior Associate
ABD:DMF:mab
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8. Based on discussions with Steve O'Conner, Treasurer of
Rhode Island Zoning Board Association, August 15, 1985, and Rick
Keller.
9. Based on discussions with Rick Keller, and Dan Varin
Director of Statewide Planning for Rhode Island, July 21, 1985.
10. Based on discussions with Liz Head, member of Rhode
Island League of Women Voters, August 8, 1985, and Rick Keller.
11. Based on discussions with Rick Keller.
12. See Alan Talbot, Settling Things, Six Case Studies in
Environmental Mediation, (Washington, D.C.: The Conservation
Foundation, 1983).
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